Background

The FSSF had arrived in Italy on 19 November 1943 to find that General Mark Clark's U.S. 5th Army was readying an offensive on the mountains below Monte Cassino. The Germans had fortified the chain of heights northeast from Camino-Difensa halfway across Italy as an additional barrier to Allied forces attempting to break through to Rome. While the main defensive line, the Gustav Line, was formidable, the additional fortifications at Camino-Difenso (the "Winter Line") were intended as an additional delay.

November marks the heaviest month for precipitation in Italy, and apart from adding to sheer misery for those out in the elements, the seasonal rains that had fallen since September had the effect of swelling rivers, washing out roads and bridges, and creating cascading logistical burdens, from the engineers who had to work constantly to keep the routes open, to the supporting arms who struggled to keep ammunition and supplies flowing over these routes.

By early November the enemy had been able to prepare the mountains for holding. Against this situation the three Allied corps in the Fifth Army were extended beyond convenient supply. The men were cold and tired at the end of a long offensive.

Before a rest was allowed General Clark decided one final thrust would be made to get into the Liri Valley. British 10 Corps on the coastal flank was to make an effort against Mount Camino. American VI Corps with the 3d Infantry Division carrying the ball would penetrate the Mignano Gap as far as Cassino. On this height the Germans hold one panzer grenadier division, with the Hermann Goering Division in reserve back toward Cassino fresh and ready for commitment. On the British side the 56th Division, tired and line-weary from continuous fighting since the southern landings, moved out to attack the Camino heights on November 5. Caviti and Sipicciano were taken by envelopments to place the 201st Guards Brigade and the 168th Infantry Brigade on the lower slopes. On the right of this effort the 3d Division sent one battalion of the 7th Infantry (Regiment) against Monte la Difensa. It was wet, hard, rocky work. Sufficient artillery had not yet been brought up to jar loose the dug-in enemy.¹

When the British 56th Division took Calabritto, German counter-attacks came in on the Guards Brigade furiously for two days. The U.S. 3d Division tried to get at the main German positions guarding the Mignano Gap, named la Difensa (Hill 960)-Mt. Lungo-Cannavinelle. All three heights had to be secured in order to clear a path down Highway 7 into Cassino. The heights at Difensa were steep enough to require scaling, while the lowlands of the Gap were laced with mines and fortifications. Attacks on lesser heights at Cannavinelle and Rotondo were costly but managed to get the first penetrations into the Gap between November 5 and 9. Ten days of attacks, however, failed to turn up material success at la Difensa.

For one thing, a battalion had been sent to do a two-regiment job; complete commitment of the whole regiment was still not enough on this redoubtable 3000-yard front. Perpendicular cliffs just below the peak proved to be as frustrating a position as American troops had faced. This mountain was a veritable fortress. On top of the cliffs enemy snipers were using every trick to augment their commanding position with their advantage in height. Any small toehold gained by the 7th Infantry was dislodged with a hail of grenades and machine-gun fire. American artillery was pounding the top of the hill repeatedly and the enemy suffered losses. But the mountain was well cut with trails, and immediate shifts in reserves at all times provided the Germans with an adequate holding force.

Not only was the 7th in the precarious position of looking up the side of almost sheer cliff while unable to maneuver, but the approaches to the assault position were at the end of a seven-hour climb. Supplies were never adequate. Evacuation of casualties down the mountain required six hours. Throughout these bitter ten days, rain stopped only at brief intervals while at night the cold brought snow. Suffering from exposure was extreme.²

This was the general situation in which the First Special Service Force found itself.

Monte la Difensa, viewed from the north-east. Monte Camino is on the left.
U.S. Army photo

Operational Plan

Two corps were to attack the Camino hill mass overlooking the Mignano Gap; the British 10th Corps, to the left, was to attack Monte Camino and the U.S. 2nd Corps to seize adjoining heights on the northern half of the massif. Opposite them were troops of the 15th Panzergrenadier Division. The two highest features were to be taken by the 1st Special Service Force, Hill 960, and la Remetanea (also known as Hill 907).³

The task of planning the Force's first battle had fallen to Colonel Frederick (shown at right after promotion to Brigadier-General). The attack had been scheduled originally for 27 November, then delayed due to bad weather. Artillery support was delayed, and air superiority had not yet been won over southern Italy, making the possibility of Luftwaffe intervention a consideration - particularly when General Clark's overall plan for the attack called for aerial resupply. The first Canadian Forceman to be killed in action was among a group of five men wounded in a training accident; two of them had died. D-Day for the operation was rescheduled for 3 December, when both acceptable weather and sufficient artillery support were expected.⁴

The operation itself was divided into two phases. The difficulty of the climb required the ascent to be made over two days. The Force had to make do the seven-hour trip by climbing part-way up the mountain the first night, in darkness and absolute quiet, then hiding out during the day making a final ascent the next night.⁵

The approach march was made without incident, and a bivouac was established in a wood on the north-eastern slope of the mountain. The final ascent was to be made up a sheer cliff. The element of surprise was to favour heavily in the detailed assault plan drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson, commanding the lead battalion, and there was a presumption that the Germans would not defend such a terrain feature thinking that no one would dare scale it. Heavy artillery fire masked the sound of the ascent.⁶

The Battle

See also the article on Monte la Difensa-Monte la Remetenea

The Canadian Official History sums up the battle succinctly:

On the night of 2-3 December Colonel Williamson's 2nd Special Service Regiment climbed the almost precipitous side of Mount la Difensa, using scaling ropes at the steepest places. In the early dawn the assault battalion, which also was commanded by a Canadian, Lt.-Col. T.C. MacWilliam, drove the stubbornly resisting enemy from their caves and pillboxes around the summit. For two days the 2nd Regiment held Hill 960, repelling a counter-attack by the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment early on the 4th. On 5 December Williamson's 1st Battalion pushed forward along the narrow ridge which led to Mount la Remetanea, 1000 yards to the north. The attackers came under mortar and machine-gun fire from Mount Camino, which was still in enemy hands, but gained the crest of their objective without meeting direct opposition. On the following day Mount Camino fell to the 56th (London) Division, and by 8 December the whole Camino hill mass had been cleared of the enemy. The Winter Line had been pried loose from its southern anchor. The First Special Service Force had fought its first action with distinction; it had incurred more than 400 casualties, of which Canadian losses numbered 27 killed (including Lt.-Col. MacWilliam) and 64 wounded.⁷

Aftermath

To complete the freeing of the Mignano Gap it was next necessary to capture Mount Sammucro--a huge mass of towering cliffs and ridges which from the north dominated Highway No. 6 and the village of San Pietro Infine, eight miles east of Cassino.191 The main 4000-foot peak (Hill 1205) fell to the U.S. 36th Division on 7 December, and after two bitter battles (in which Italian troops - the 1st Italian Motorized Group - entered the campaign on the Allied side) the Division occupied San Pietro on 17 December.⁸

Battle Honours

The following Canadian unit was awarded the Battle Honour "Monte Camino" for participation in these actions:

• 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion (First Special Service Force)

Notes

1. Burhans, Robert D. The First Special Service Force: A War History of The North Americans 1942-1944 (Methuen Publications, Toronto, ON, 1981) ISBN 0-458-95020-1 p.91

2. Ibid,, p.95

3. Nicholson, Gerald The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1957), pp.453-454

4. Joyce, Kenneth H. Snow Plough and the Jupiter Deception: The story of the 1st Special Service Force and the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion, 1942-1945 (Vanwell Publishing Ltd., St. Catharines, ON, 2006) ISBN 1-55125-094-2 pp.152-153

5. Dancocks, Ibid, p.197

6. Joyce, Ibid, pp.153-155

7. Nicholson, Ibid, p.454

8. Ibid