Background

The FSSF had arrived in Italy on 19 November 1943 to find that General Mark Clark's U.S. 5th Army was readying an offensive on the mountains below Monte Cassino. The Germans had fortified the chain of heights northeast from Camino-Difensa halfway across Italy as an additional barrier to Allied forces attempting to break through to Rome. While the main defensive line, the Gustav Line, was formidable, the additional fortifications at Camino-Difenso (the "Winter Line") were intended as an additional delay. The First Special Service Force was praised for its work in securing Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea at the start of December. The Force was pulled back to Santa Maria for a rest, having been reduced to fewer than 1,400 men.¹

The Force began training for new missions on 17 December, and rumours were rife, including Mount Cairo and even Monte Cassino. Training focused on the necessity for fighting in small groups. As they trained, the 5th Army's efforts to close up to the Gustav Line continued, and the 36th Division launched attacks on high ground straddling Highway No. 6, attempting to take both Mount Sammucro (Hill 1205) and Mount Lungo (Hill 351). Some of the fighting in this area was chronicled in the documentary The Battle of San Pietro. The division had advanced just beyond San Pietro on 16 December, and on 20 December the British X Corps began its own advance to the Garigliano River. The same day, the FSSF received orders to move to Ceppagna and prepare to seize Monte Vischiataro (Hill 1109) and the adjacent heights.

While the 3rd Regiment, tasked for the Vischiataro assault, began its preparations to move, reports were received from patrols on Sammucro of German hold-outs on Hill 720, which were overlooking the start line for the 36th Division's own operations. Hill 720 (also referred to variously as Hill 702 (on German maps) and Hill 730 (on Italian maps)) now became an intermediary objective, and was assigned to the 1st Regiment of the SSF along with the 141st Infantry Regiment, then operating from Mount Sammucro. The 1st Regiment moved up to Sammucro on 22 December through rain and fog while the rest of the Force was still camped at Ceppagna.² The 504th Parachute Infantry were placed under command of the Force, and assigned to attack Hill 687 while the Force took Hill 720 with the assistance of the 141st Infantry. The 6th Armored Field Artillery Group  was ordered into direct support along with the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and the 456th Parachute Field Artillery, temporarily detached from Sicily to support the FSSF throughout its time in Italy.³

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When Colonel Frederick climbed up the east flank of Sammucro on 23 December into clouds almost down to the ground, he found that coordination and communication between the 1st Regiment of his FSSF, the 504th PIR, and the 141st Infantry was "not in battle state", and he received permission to postpone the attack for 24 hours, citing also the condition of trails and weather. Once again, as during the attack on Difensa, the assault troops had to spend a cold waiting period dependent on man-packed supplies to be brought forward as there was no other way to bring up food, water, ammunition and other necessities except on another man's back.

This time the attack would be downhill against the enemy. Throughout the day before Christmas, and the attack, enemy artillery worked its shelling programs regularly across 1205 and approaches, while the infantry played its mortars in the same locality at periodic intervals.

Having bivouacked west of the 1205 peak at about the 1,000 meter level, First Regiment started moving at dusk Christmas eve to a lower line for the attack. Back of this line and just down the southern slope 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, had planted its heavy weapons - reinforced to 16 heavy machine guns and 8 heavy mortars - to render covering fire for the assault. The artillery plan was to plaster the 6th Armored FA Group howitzers and 36th Division weapons on the objective and surrounding peaks for one hour prior to midnight which was H-hour. Shortly before 10:00 P.M. however the Force commander held up the attack three hours to permit final coordination.⁴

The pause did not have the desired effect:

The attack was set to commence on the holiest day of the year for Germany's Lutheran soldiers: Christmas Eve. However, at the last minute, the attack was postponed until Christmas Day while final details of the operation were being ironed out. The early hours of December 25 might have found the Germans either keenly vigilant or soulfully distracted...Responding to the Allied artillery barrage from the Sixth Armored Artillery Group and two other artillery battalions that broke out about an hour before the operation was to get under way, the Germans unleashed shelling that began to fall on the slope of Sammucro (above the German positions on Hill 720)...The shelling severed the (2nd) battalion's lines of communication with the outside world and boxed the attackers in. As intelligence officer Robert Burhans later observed: "Mortar and artillery falling along the line of troops on the black mountainside...disorganized the assault battalion to such an extent that no forward movement was possible."⁵

Some of the shellfire landing among the FSSF men was friendly artillery. A forward observer from the 131st Field Artillery had called for a concentration on Hill 720, and part of it fell among the men of the 1st Regiment; radio communications were able to quickly cease the fire but three men were killed in the accidental shelling.⁶

The battalion was not ready to advance down the west shoulder of Mount Sammucro until before dawn. The defenders were known to belong to the 3rd Battalion, Panzergrenadier Regiment 71, and were under strength. Lieutenant-Colonel Akehurt's command post had been hit by German fire, wounding Akehurst and the reconnaissance NCO and killing the adjutant. Colonel Marshall, the regimental commander, came down to the 2d Battalion to take charge of the attack and reorganize the companies. Lieutenant Omar Smith organized his No. 6 Company on the right flank, Captain McFadden of No. 4 Company in battalion reserve was warned to be ready to move into line, and at 05:00hrs, No. 5 company in the centre signalled that he was ready to attack. The first skirmishers stepped off into heavy machine gun fire while the HMGs of the 141st Infantry duelled with the German guns.⁷

There was little cover for the attackers; the ground was entirely rock, and casualties in No. 5 and No. 6 Companies mounted quickly, the former having only been able to reorganize 30 men for the attack. Captain McCall remained in attack of No. 5 Company despite a shell fragment in his neck, directing the fire of his light mortars and directing the platoons. Dawn was breaking by time his company had worked its way onto 720 and were close enough to the Germans to engage in hand-to-hand combat. Lieutenant Smith's No. 6 Company on the north ridge had faced an equally disorganized start, and Smith was wounded by a sniper early in the attack. A company from the 1st Battalion followed up the 2d Battalion in echelon, and by 07:00hrs the 2d had gained the objective, with No. 6 Company working down the right slope to clear out stone entrenchments with hand grenades while No. 5 Company executed a left flanking on the nose of Hill 720. The junction of the two companies was completed in the face of two German machine guns. Lieutenant Smith dropped out short of the objective, his wound proving fatal, the stretcher bearers unable to get over the open ground in time.⁸

The 504th were able to evict the Germans from nearby Hill 687 and Hill 720 had been taken; the cost to the 1st Regiment had been 65 killed and wounded.⁹ The 2nd Regiment's No. 4 Company lost 12 casualties. One man who fell off the hill during the fight lay injured until 27 December when patrols were able to locate him. He was evacuated after three days of lying alone, cold, injured and hungry.¹⁰

German POWs carry a wounded Forceman back to Ceppagna. US Army photo

Aftermath

The plan for the 2nd U.S. Corps was to follow up the successful capture of Hill 720 with the capture of San Vittore, securing a new line of departure for future operations. Patrols by U.S. infantry units were unable to penetrate the town, and the town itself was not taken for over a week. The 1st Regiment of the FSSF, for its part, came down off the mountain, taking its dead to San Pietro Infine and resting at Ceppagna before the next large move toward Cassino could be contemplated.¹¹

Battle Honours

The following Canadian unit was awarded the Battle Honour "Hill 720" for participation in these actions:

• 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion (First Special Service Force)

Notes

1. Joyce, Kenneth H. Snow Plough and the Jupiter Deception: The story of the 1st Special Service Force and the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion, 1942-1945 (Vanwell Publishing Ltd., St. Catharines, ON, 2006) ISBN 1-55125-094-2 pp.168-169

2. Ibid, p.170

3. Burhans, Robert D. The First Special Service Force: A War History of The North Americans 1942-1944 (Methuen Publications, Toronto, ON, 1981) ISBN 0-458-95020-1 pp.131-133

4. Ibid, pp.134-135

5. Nadler, John A Perfect Hell: The Forgotten Story of the Canadian Commandos of the Second World War (Anchor Canada, 2005) ISBN 978-385-66141-6 p.143

6. Joyce, Ibid, p.172

7. Burhans, Ibid, pp.136-137

8. Ibid, pp.136-138

9. Nadler, Ibid, p.144

10. Burhans, Ibid, pp.139-140

11. Ibid