Background

The FSSF had arrived in Italy on 19 November 1943 to find that General Mark Clark's U.S. 5th Army was readying an offensive on the mountains below Monte Cassino. The Germans had fortified the chain of heights northeast from Camino-Difensa halfway across Italy as an additional barrier to Allied forces attempting to break through to Rome. While the main defensive line, the Gustav Line, was formidable, the additional fortifications at Camino-Difenso (the "Winter Line") were intended as an additional delay. The First Special Service Force was praised for its work in securing Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea at the start of December. The Force was pulled back to Santa Maria for a rest, having been reduced to fewer than 1,400 men.¹

The Force began training for new missions on 17 December, and rumours were rife, including Mount Cairo and even Monte Cassino. Training focused on the necessity for fighting in small groups. As they trained, the 5th Army's efforts to close up to the Gustav Line continued, and the 36th Division launched attacks on high ground straddling Highway No. 6, attempting to take both Mount Sammucro (Hill 1205) and Mount Lungo (Hill 351). Some of the fighting in this area was chronicled in the documentary The Battle of San Pietro. The division had advanced just beyond San Pietro on 16 December, and on 20 December the British X Corps began its own advance to the Garigliano River. The same day, the FSSF received orders to move to Ceppagna and prepare to seize Monte Vischiataro (Hill 1109) and the adjacent heights.²

While the 3rd Regiment, tasked for the Vischiataro assault, began its preparations to move, reports were received from patrols on Sammucro of German hold-outs on Hill 720, which were overlooking the start line for the 36th Division's own operations. Hill 720 was assigned as an intermediary objective to the 1st Regiment of the SSF, and after a delayed start to the operations originally scheduled for 23 December, was taken in an attack by the 1st Regiment on 25 December at a cost of 65 killed and wounded, with 12 further casualties to a reinforcing company of the 2nd Regiment.³

Click to enlarge

Morale among the Forcemen at the end of 1943 was tested by the knowledge their special skills - parachute training, amphibious training, demolitions - were not being used to any great advantage, and that they were being employed for the most part as regular infantry. The Canadian contingent, which kept its own war diary, was specifically critical on that point. They were also handed a severe blow to their morale when the senior Canadian of the Force, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Williamson was ordered to leave on New Year's Day 1944. Williamson had commanded the 2nd Regiment since the early days of the FSSF in Montana, but after the battle at la Difensa, a number of officers went to Colonel Frederick to express a lack of confidence in him.

The 2nd Regiment, badly depleted at la Difensa, the Force's first combat action, had been used as support for the other two regiments in the actions since. Frederick canvassed members of the regiment for signed affidavits to back up the claims that Williamson was unfit for command. A number of statements were provided, by the following:

• Captain E.O. Olson (American, intelligence officer)

• Staff Sergeant K.R.S. Meiklejohn (Canadian, intelligence cell)

• 1st Lieutenant W.S. Story (Canadian, recently promoted from the ranks, intelligence cell)

• Major Walter Gray (American, Executive Officer of the 2nd Regiment at la Difensa)

• Sergeant C.F. Rigg (American, serving at 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment headquarters)

• Lieutenant-Colonel R. Moore (American, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment)

Armed with the information supplied by Williamson's subordinates, Frederick filled out a confidential report at the Canadian Army's administrative base at Avellino on 30 December. Frederick had concluded that Williamson did not command the confidence of the men in his regiment, based on the statements which spoke of nervousness under fire. Williamson filed a response per protocol on 2 January and underwent a psychological examination. No enquiry was conducted, and the Canadian Army concluded that Williamson had lost the confidence of subordinates and superiors alike; any officer deemed unfit for a command was by regulation to be returned directly to Canada rather than retained overseas. On 12 January, Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Akehurst was named as senior Canadian, and the official word was given that Williamson was suffering from ulcers. On 14 January, a number of affidavits were collected from among Canadian officers in defence of the sacked Williamson and delivered to Avellino. The testimony sat on a desk for ten days as Williamson went into transit back to the U.K. on the first leg of his journey home to Canada, and then the affidavits were destroyed. The departure of Williamson put the 2nd Regiment into the hands of Moore, with Major Stan Waters (a Canadian) as his Executive Officer.⁴

The capture of Hill 720 effectively ended the first phase of the 5th Army's Winter Line operations, sealing the right flank of the U.S. 34th Division, moving towards San Pietro Infine, and assisting the movement of the 1st Armored Division as it prepared to assault Mount Lungo. On 1 January 1944, the 5th Army announced the objective of the third phase of its current operations: closing on the line of the Rapido River. The task assigned to the FSSF by the 2nd U.S. Corps was identical (word for word) to that assigned previously on 20 December, to secure high ground on the Corps' right while seizing Mount Vischiataro and its surrounding peaks. The 34th Division and 1st Armored Division were to sweep the low-lying hills north of Highway 6 and push down the valley toward the Rapido. On the left of the 2nd Corps, the British 10th Corps was expected to keep abreast, its own left flank on the Mediterranean.⁵

Lieutenant W.H. Langdon, carrying full kit, photographed in front of the casualty clearing station at Le Noci, north of Venafro, in January 1944. Visible are the special mountain trousers the Force was issued. He is also equipped with winter shoe-pacs and a packboard for carrying supplies. LAC photo

Force Plan

The Force was to be aligned as originally organized before the battle of Hill 720; the 3rd Regiment was to secure a northern route to Mount Vischiataro, travelling over the barren hills on the right of the line. The 1st Regiment was to proceed to the notch at Forcella del Moscoso (Height 708) and support the 3rd Regiment. The 2nd Regiment was to split its battalions as it had at Hill 720, with No. 1 and No. 3 Companies attached to the 3rd Regiment for stretcher bearer and supply duties (respectively) while No. 2 Company provided both services to the 1st Regiment. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment was to reduce Hill 724 and secure an advance command post at Radicosa two nights prior to the 3rd Regiment's assault.⁶

Frederick talked to his regimental commanders and II Corps and put together a plan that was simple. Marshall's 1st Regiment would move west of Radicosa, on the Force's left flank, and aim at Vischiataro itself. Walker's 3rd Regiment would seize the highest ground to the right of the mountain, covering that flank of the main assault. Moore would send one battalion of his (2nd) regiment to occupy the space in between.

The plan was kept simple because the terrain was difficult and complicated. Long marches were needed to even get to the start lines, and the weather was uncommonly bad. High winds often came in the form of sudden snow squalls. There were now three inches of snow in the valleys and growing drifts in sheltered pockets above 600 metres. Above 900 metres there were five inches of snow on the ground. There were mines on the approaches and booby-traps on the trails, and these were now covered in snow. During this period in Italy, 12 of the newer T-24 "Weasel" Cargo Carriers that had been brought by the Force to Italy were taken out of their crates to aid in the transport of supplies. However less prone to mechanical breakdown, it was quickly found that mules were actually preferred to navigate the supplies over this inhospitable terrain.⁷

Prisoners taken in the hill 720 fighting revealed that the Germans in the line from San Vittore to Radicosa were from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 71st Panzergrenadier Regiment. Behind them, two regiments of the Austrian 44th Infantry Division had just arrived at the front.⁸ The 44th Division had been raised in Austria in 1943 after the original had been destroyed at Stalingrad in February of that year, and granted the honour title Reichsgrenadier Division Hoch-und-Deutschmeister.⁹ While there is a tendency, particularly in the various hobby press to regard any "named" Wehrmacht unit as an elite by dint of the fact it was identified by more than just a number, one history of the Force claims the 44th had special winter and mountain training before deployment to central Italy.¹⁰

Clearing the Way

The 3rd Regiment moved out into a snowstorm just after sun-up on 1 January in order to establish a bivouac south of Monte Corno Vesse. The 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Bourne) was to move left toward 850 from there, and the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Gilday) was to move right and clear the saddle running north-east from Hill 957. The 2nd Regiment began patrolling Hill 702 (also called Hill 724), received an issue of cold weather gear, and planned for an attack at 09:00hrs on 2 January, past Radicosa, bypassing it in order to seize 702. The attack was postponed later on 1 January, as was the 3rd Regiment's assault; they pitched their tents, and tried to dig in. Both regiments were told to wait for 24 hours to establish better communications.¹¹

The remainder of the 2nd Regiment set its sights on an obscure crag called Hill 724, which was important only because it overlooked the ancient alpine village of Radicosa, which Frederick hoped to use as a forward command post for endgame operations on Majo and Vischiataro. A three-man scouting parol that had been fired upon as it crept towards Radicosa confirmed that the Germans still held this tiny community of six stone houses and a church.

As Adna Underhill later wrote, the plan was elementary: "bypass Radicosa on the north and east; take Hill 724 from the north; consolidate that high ground, then move down into Radicosa. Cold or no cold," he observed, "this was the kind of action the Force understood and enjoyed, if there's enjoyment in any military combat." And it was cold. On the night of January 3, when Moore's 2nd Regiment went into action, the Force men mounted the dark slopes of Hill 724 and climbed into weather as forbidding as the enemy.¹²

The weather in central Italy was challenging; at 500 metres elevation three inches of snow hampered movement while at 600 metres there was five inches of snow, and drifts, with strong winds prevailing in the valleys.

Capture of Radicosa

See also main article on Radicosa

The 2nd Regiment bypassed Radicosa, surprising troops on Hill 702/724, and captured it, precipitating a German withdrawal. The Germans in Radicosa pulled back to the northwest.¹³ By noon on 4 January, the 1st Regiment occupied the handful of buildings in Radicosa (five houses and a church), which had been a priority in order to build forward supply dumps for the continued advance. Mines and demolitions charges left by the Germans were de-fuzed in the houses and on the trails, and hold-outs on Hill 675 were eliminated. Further patrols confirmed the enemy had indeed withdrawn. The stage was set for the attack on Majo itself.¹⁴

Situation on 4 January and Organization of Task Force B

The 3rd Regiment had spent 4 January expanding their own gains and sending patrols out, linking up with the U.S. 45th Division of the 6th U.S. Corps on their right at Colle Rippa, the regiment actually operating inside the 6th Corps boundary. One company was south of Viticuso and patrols from other companies had approached 1,200 yards east of Monte Majo without encountering the enemy. Companies also occupied Hill 914 and Colle Stefano without seeing organized resistance.¹⁵

On the left of the  (3rd) Regiment's front 5 company stole onto Colle Stefano (onto the eastern knob, separated from the western hump by a slight saddle), found to everyone's surprise that no enemy was on the peak. It had been apparent for several days that this intermediate height immediately fronting the high objective would have been the ideal defense line for the Germans following their ejection from the Radicosa line. As the western height had been allotted to First Regiment no reconnaissance was pushed into that part of the hill. Meanwhile 6 Company was occupying Hills 870 and 914 without resistance. Lt John Mitchell from 4 Company took a patrol atop Hill 1065 directly overlooking the Cervaro-Viticuso mule trail and immediately under the eaves of menacing Mt. Majo. The enemy had gone.¹⁶

The 3rd Regiment had been actively trespassing in the 45th Division's area, though that formation was weary after six straight weeks of front line exposure and were "against a sheer mountain mass full of enemy" and had suffered "(r)ecent setbacks on Mt. Molino and Mt. Cavallo" and were to be relieved in six days by units of the French Corps. The mission of the FSSF was to protect the flank of the U.S. 2nd Corps, push forward, and secure high ground overlooking the projected axis of advance of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, up Highway 6 toward the Gustav Line.

Only one decision remained. Colonel Walker was directed to take his (3rd) (R)egiment against Mt. Majo. Colonel Frederick informed Corps headquarters of his decision to assault Mt. Majo, explaining that until this flanking height fell to the Force the assault on Mt. Vischiataro was tactically impossible.¹⁷

The 34th Division to the south cleared the Germans from San Vittore and patrols of the 1st Regiment took prisoners while reconnoitring a route to Hill 1109, finding the Germans had evacuated the ground between Valle dell' Ospedale and the hills west of San Stefano.

The plan of attack on Monte Majo was changed, and the 1st Regiment was to assault Monte Vischiataro simultaneous to the 3rd Regiment's attack on Monte Majo. No. 5 Company of the 3rd Regiment remained on the right-hand shelf of Stefano while the 1st Regiment moved onto the prominent western hump, tied in his flank, and prepared for a midnight advance towards Vischiataro.

Attack on Majo

At 16:00hrs No. 6 Company of the 3rd Regiment moved up to Hill 1065, the Viticuso mule track its jumping-off point, the 1st Battalion moving up the trail on its right. Contact had not been made with the German main line of resistance, as the German divisional commander had pulled the 44th Hoch-und-Deutschmeister back to high ground. The recent prisoner captures had revealed the enemy atop Majo to be the 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion south behind Stefano and on Hill 1109. Further south, the 71st Panzergrenadier Regiment faced the left flank of the Force and the 168th U.S. Infantry Regiment. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the German 132nd Infantry Regiment had about 300 men in each, equal to the fighting strength of the FSSF's 3rd Regiment, or in other words, outnumbering the FSSF units in the assault.

As soon as it was dark, men of the Force started up the Majo slope, the No. 2 Company of the 1st Battalion on the right, No. 3 Company on the left, No. 1 Company in reserve. The attack was made under a full moon and with artillery support firing from Ceppagna. The plan was to drive the 1st Battalion right at the peak and sweep the 2nd Battalion to the left, taking Hill 1259 from the west. No. 3 Company echeloned to the left rear prepatory to its flanking maneuver, and on the right, the 2nd Battalion moved up in column, prepared to take post in skirmishing formation before the objective, a mule train with additional supplied scheduled to follow on an hour later. The only resistance in the early going was scattered mortar fire, and the 1st Battalion was moving steadily by 22:00hrs. Just afterwards, light machine gun fire from half a dozen positions opened up, including guns bypassed earlier, striking the rear of the right-hand battalion. Snipers began firing tracers to indicate targets for mortarmen, and the 2nd Battalion caught the worst of the high explosive and machine-gun fires.

Stopped just short of the main defences of Mount Majo, the 1st Battalion went into action, and charged at the summit, the white snow and bright moonlight silhouetting the Forcemen. The companies managed to reach the ridgetop and begin cleaning out machine gun emplacements. The Austrians and Poles at the top had been ordered to hold the positions at all costs. No. 1 Company aided the attack by swinging to the right of No. 2 Company and reducing positions firing from the north. The 2nd Battalion had to fight uphill against a second line of ridges as the enemy withdrew, and several German machine-guns firing from southwestern knobs atop Majo cut off No. 6 Company and regimental headquarters from the main column before No. 4 Company silenced them.²⁰

At 9:00 in the morning, in the after-battle silence that fell over the area, a patrol from 2 Company informed Colonel Walker that Majo and its main peaks had fallen but with great difficulty. Word also came from 2d Battalion that the scattered knobs around Majo were each occupied by a company. Later in the morning the spiteful enemy artillery started pounding the newly taken height. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Division (as Hitler had designated the 44th Division) having gathered its ranks together, started to obey its suicidal orders to retake the hills. Counterattacks continued for forty-eight hours.²¹

Majo was taken, but it did not mark the end of the battle:

Majo rivalled Difensa as a feat of physical endurance; and, like Difensa, the capture of the peak marked the beginning of a prolonged fight. "We used up all our ammunition in the main assault," (Lieutenant-Colonel Tom) Gilday recalls, "and Jerry left his machine-guns with lots of ammunition behind, when we pushed him out, and we had to use his weapons for the next day, or even two days, before we could get resupplied from out base." He estimates that the Germans launched forty-two counter-attacks in the next few days, and the captured weapons proved to be invaluable, as was the American artillery, which responded to countless calls for assistance.²²

The supply problem was acute; one regimental commander recalled having to drink melted snow for two days because of the shortage of fresh water on the mountain top.²³

Mount Vischiataro

See also main article on Mount Vischiataro

Simultaneous to the attack on Majo on 6 January, the 1st Regiment moved towards Mount Vischiataro (Hill 1109). The depleted regiment had rough going, unaided by the poor maps, and despite taking out several enemy posts and obtaining several prisoners, the regimental commander turned back as the night wore on, convinced his force was too weakened to continue. The 1st Regiment moved to Mount Majo on 7 January, above Vischiataro, and with the assistance of the 133rd Infantry Regiment, attacked downhill towards Hill 1270, and then south onto Vischiataro. Hill 1270 was secured by Company L of the 133rd while Vischiataro eventually fell without a shot, as the enemy evacuated during the 7th.

Aftermath

The Force spent another week cleaning up rearguards, but for all intents and purposes its time in the Italian mountains was over. IN the words of one historian:

It had been a terrible campaign in brutally cold weather over treeless, snow-covered crags in the face of gale-like winds. Getting supplies up and casualties out required super-human effort. Frostbite was endemic. Over half the Force's strength became casualties through battle, exposure, frostbite and fatigue. The six-week campaign cost the Canadian contingent a further 70 casualties and by the end of January only 350 remained. This draining of strength was exacerbated when, under an impending reinforcement crisis, National Defence Headquarters temporarily halted the movement of Canadian replacements to the Force. It was in this weakened state that the 1st Special Service Force embarked on its next mission - Anzio.²⁴

Battle Honours

The following Canadian unit was awarded the Battle Honour "Mount Majo" for participation in these actions:

• 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion (First Special Service Force)

Notes

1. Joyce, Kenneth H. Snow Plough and the Jupiter Deception: The story of the 1st Special Service Force and the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion, 1942-1945 (Vanwell Publishing Ltd., St. Catharines, ON, 2006) ISBN 1-55125-094-2 pp.168-169

2. Ibid, p.170

3. Burhans, Robert D. The First Special Service Force: A War History of The North Americans 1942-1944 (Methuen Publications, Toronto, ON, 1981) ISBN 0-458-95020-1 pp.131-133

4. Joyce, Ibid, pp.168-180

5. Burhans, Ibid, pp.139-140

6. Ibid, p.141

7. Joyce, Ibid, p.185

8. Burhans, Ibid, p.142

9. Williamson, Gordon German Army Elite Units (Osprey Publishing Ltd., Botley, Oxford, UK, 2002) ISBN 1-84176-405-1 pp.18-19

10. Joyce, pp.185-186, though Joyce also mentions the unit had "just moved in from the Russian Front" - the division was in fact rebuilt in Austria after the original was destroyed at Stalingrad, and performed anti-partisan duties in northern Italy before moving to the Cassino front. See also Glanz, David Slaughterhouse: The Handbook of the Eastern Front (Aberjona Press, Bedford, PA, 2005 ISBN 0-9717650-9-X p.182) which states the division was destroyed in January 1943, reformed in France in April 1943, then reconstituted as the Reichsgrenadier Division "Hoch-und-Deutschsmeister".

11. Joyce, Ibid, p.186

12. Nadler, John A Perfect Hell: The Forgotten Story of the Canadian Commandos of the Second World War (Anchor Canada, 2005) ISBN 978-385-66141-6 pp.145-146

13. Burhans, Ibid, pp.143-145

14. Ibid, p.145

15. Joyce, Ibid, p.187

16. Burhans, Ibid, p.147

17. Ibid, p.148

18. Ibid, pp.147-149

19. Joyce, Ibid, p.187. Burhans gives the two-thirds figure for the 3rd Regiment (p.148); Joyce reports this as "three-quarters and still reporting casualties." (p.187)

20. Burhans, Ibid, pp.150-152

21. Ibid, p.153

22. Dancocks, Daniel G. D-Day Dodgers: The Canadians in Italy 1943-45 (McLelland & Stewart Inc., Toronto, ON, 1991) ISBN 0-7710-2544-0 p.199. Burhans and Joyce put the number of counter-attacks at 27 and "more than 25", respectively.

23. Joyce, Ibid, p.189

24. McKay, Donald A. Gaudeamus Igitur "Therefore Rejoice" (Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) ISBN 1894255534 p.264