Background

See also main article on Mount Majo

The FSSF had arrived in Italy on 19 November 1943 to find that General Mark Clark's U.S. 5th Army was readying an offensive on the mountains below Monte Cassino, and received praise for its work in securing Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea at the start of December. The Force was pulled back to Santa Maria for a rest, having been reduced to fewer than 1,400 men.¹

The Force began training for new missions on 17 December while the 5th Army's efforts to close up to the Gustav Line continued. On 20 December the British X Corps began its own advance to the Garigliano River and the FSSF received orders to move to Ceppagna and prepare to seize Monte Vischiataro (Hill 1109) and the adjacent heights.² The first act in the battle was the seizing of Hill 720, accomplished on 23 December by the 1st Regiment of the FSSF on 25 December.³

The capture of Hill 720 effectively ended the first phase of the 5th Army's Winter Line operations. On 1 January 1944, the 5th Army announced the objective of the third phase: closing on the line of the Rapido River. The task assigned to the FSSF by the 2nd U.S. Corps remained the securing of high ground on the Corps' right and capture of Mount Vischiataro and its surrounding peaks.⁴

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Force Plan

The Force was to be aligned as originally organized before the battle of Hill 720; the 3rd Regiment was to secure a northern route to Mount Vischiataro, travelling over the barren hills on the right of the line. The 1st Regiment was to proceed to the notch at Forcella del Moscoso (Height 708) and support the 3rd Regiment. The 2nd Regiment was to split its battalions as it had at Hill 720, with No. 1 and No. 3 Companies attached to the 3rd Regiment for stretcher bearer and supply duties (respectively) while No. 2 Company provided both services to the 1st Regiment. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment was to reduce Hill 724 and secure an advance command post at Radicosa two nights prior to the 3rd Regiment's assault.⁵

Frederick talked to his regimental commanders and II Corps and put together a plan that was simple. Marshall's 1st Regiment would move west of Radicosa, on the Force's left flank, and aim at Vischiataro itself. Walker's 3rd Regiment would seize the highest ground to the right of the mountain, covering that flank of the main assault. Moore would send one battalion of his (2nd) regiment to occupy the space in between.

The plan was kept simple because the terrain was difficult and complicated. Long marches were needed to even get to the start lines, and the weather was uncommonly bad. High winds often came in the form of sudden snow squalls. There were now three inches of snow in the valleys and growing drifts in sheltered pockets above 600 metres. Above 900 metres there were five inches of snow on the ground. There were mines on the approaches and booby-traps on the trails, and these were now covered in snow. During this period in Italy, 12 of the newer T-24 "Weasel" Cargo Carriers that had been brought by the Force to Italy were taken out of their crates to aid in the transport of supplies. However less prone to mechanical breakdown, it was quickly found that mules were actually preferred to navigate the supplies over this inhospitable terrain.⁶

Prisoners taken in the hill 720 fighting revealed that the Germans in the line from San Vittore to Radicosa were from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 71st Panzergrenadier Regiment. Behind them, two regiments of the Austrian 44th Infantry Division had just arrived at the front.⁷ The 44th Division had been raised in Austria in 1943 after the original had been destroyed at Stalingrad in February of that year, and granted the honour title Reichsgrenadier Division Hoch-und-Deutschmeister.⁸ While there is a tendency, particularly in the various hobby press to regard any "named" Wehrmacht unit as an elite by dint of the fact it was identified by more than just a number, one history of the Force claims the 44th had special winter and mountain training before deployment to central Italy.⁹

Capture of Radicosa

The 3rd Regiment moved out into a snowstorm just after sun-up on 1 January in order to establish a bivouac south of Monte Corno Vesse. The 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Bourne) was to move left toward 850 from there, and the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Gilday) was to move right and clear the saddle running north-east from Hill 957. The 2nd Regiment began patrolling Hill 702 (also called Hill 724), received an issue of cold weather gear, and planned for an attack at 09:00hrs on 2 January, past Radicosa, bypassing it in order to seize 702. The attack was postponed later on 1 January, as was the 3rd Regiment's assault; they pitched their tents, and tried to dig in. Both regiments were told to wait for 24 hours to establish better communications.¹⁰

The remainder of the 2nd Regiment set its sights on an obscure crag called Hill 724, which was important only because it overlooked the ancient alpine village of Radicosa, which Frederick hoped to use as a forward command post for endgame operations on Majo and Vischiataro. A three-man scouting parol that had been fired upon as it crept towards Radicosa confirmed that the Germans still held this tiny community of six stone houses and a church.

As Adna Underhill later wrote, the plan was elementary: "bypass Radicosa on the north and east; take Hill 724 from the north; consolidate that high ground, then move down into Radicosa. Cold or no cold," he observed, "this was the kind of action the Force understood and enjoyed, if there's enjoyment in any military combat." And it was cold. On the night of January 3, when Moore's 2nd Regiment went into action, the Force men mounted the dark slopes of Hill 724 and climbed into weather as forbidding as the enemy.¹¹

The weather in central Italy was challenging; at 500 metres elevation three inches of snow hampered movement while at 600 metres there was five inches of snow, and drifts, with strong winds prevailing in the valleys. The 2nd Regiment advanced in column of companies, No. 5, No. 4 and No 6 Companies bypassing Radicosa in that order to the north and northeast, drawing fire from an enemy outpost that had barred the way of their scouts two days before. The companies pressed on with stealth and surprised the German troops on Hill 702/724 and with only the No. 4 and No. 5 companies committed to the brief firefight that followed their discovery after daybreak, took the position and dug in. Accurate mortar fire from higher ground further on the axis of advance began to fall on them, killing Lieutenant Fern Cox, a former Canadian sergeant-major commissioned only six days previously. Daylight patrols were pushed out, finding enemy lines mere outposts, stiffened with snipers. The Germans had pulled back to Stefano and Hill 1109, while the Panzergrenadiers in Radicosa, outflanked, pulled out to the northwest.¹²

By noon on 4 January, the 1st Regiment was in the handful of buildings in Radicosa (five houses and a church), which had been a priority in order to build forward supply dumps for the continued advance. Mines and demolitions charges left by the Germans were de-fuzed in the houses and on the trails, and from Hill 675, enemy fire started to pick up, directed at troops inside the town. No. 3 Company had to send a small detachment to clear out the outpost in the late evening, the 9-man patrol returning with four POWs, one expressing amazement at the silent approach of the Forcemen. Hill 675 was occupied and thorough patrols over a radius of two miles confirmed the enemy had indeed pulled out. The stage was set for the attack on Majo itself.¹³

Battle Honours

The following Canadian unit was awarded the Battle Honour "Radicosa" for participation in these actions:

• 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion (First Special Service Force)

Notes

1. Joyce, Kenneth H. Snow Plough and the Jupiter Deception: The story of the 1st Special Service Force and the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion, 1942-1945 (Vanwell Publishing Ltd., St. Catharines, ON, 2006) ISBN 1-55125-094-2 pp.168-169

2. Ibid, p.170

3. Burhans, Robert D. The First Special Service Force: A War History of The North Americans 1942-1944 (Methuen Publications, Toronto, ON, 1981) ISBN 0-458-95020-1 pp.131-133

4. Burhans, Ibid, pp.139-140

5. Ibid, p.141

6. Joyce, Ibid, p.185

7. Burhans, Ibid, p.142

8. Williamson, Gordon German Army Elite Units (Osprey Publishing Ltd., Botley, Oxford, UK, 2002) ISBN 1-84176-405-1 pp.18-19

9. Joyce, pp.185-186, though Joyce also mentions the unit had "just moved in from the Russian Front" - the division was in fact rebuilt in Austria after the original was destroyed at Stalingrad, and performed anti-partisan duties in northern Italy before moving to the Cassino front. See also Glanz, David Slaughterhouse: The Handbook of the Eastern Front (Aberjona Press, Bedford, PA, 2005 ISBN 0-9717650-9-X p.182) which states the division was destroyed in January 1943, reformed in France in April 1943, then reconstituted as the Reichsgrenadier Division "Hoch-und-Deutschsmeister".

10. Joyce, Ibid, p.186

11. Nadler, John A Perfect Hell: The Forgotten Story of the Canadian Commandos of the Second World War (Anchor Canada, 2005) ISBN 978-385-66141-6 pp.145-146

12. Burhans, Ibid, pp.143-145

13. Ibid, p.145