History

Wars & Campaigns

Boer War
First World War

►►Western Front

►►►Trench Warfare: 1914-1916

►►Allied Offensive: 1916

►►►Allied Offensives: 1917

►►►German Offensive: 1918

►►►Advance to Victory: 1918

►►Siberia
Second World War
►►War Against Japan

►►Italian Campaign

►►►Sicily

►►►Southern Italy

►►►The Sangro and Moro

►►►Battles of the FSSF

►►►Cassino

►►►Liri Valley

►►►Advance to Florence

►►►Gothic Line

►►►Winter Lines
►►North-West Europe

►►►Normandy
►►►Southern France
►►►Channel Ports

►►►Scheldt
►►►Nijmegen Salient

►►►Rhineland

►►►Final Phase
Korean War
Cold War
Gulf War

Operations 

GAUNTLET Aug 1941

(Spitsbergen)

HUSKY Jul 1943

 (Sicily)

COTTAGE Aug 1943

 (Kiska)

TIMBERWOLF Oct 1943

(Italy)

OVERLORD Jun 1944

(Normandy)

MARKET-GARDEN Sep 44

(Arnhem)

BERLIN Nov 1944

(Nijmegen)

VERITABLE Feb 1945

(Rhineland)

Battle Honours

Boer War

►Paardeberg

18 Feb 00

First World War
Western Front
Trench Warfare: 1914-1916

Ypres, 1915

22 Apr-25 May 15

Gravenstafel

22-23 Apr 15

St. Julien

24 Apr-4 May 15

Frezenberg

8-13 May 15

Bellewaarde

24-25 May 15

Festubert, 1915

15-25 May 15

Mount Sorrel

2-13 Jun 16

Allied Offensive: 1916

►Somme, 1916

1 Jul-18 Nov 16

►Albert

.1-13 Jul 16

►Bazentin

.14-17 Jul 16

►Pozieres

.23 Jul-3 Sep 16

►Guillemont

.3-6 Sep 16

►Ginchy

.9 Sep 16

Flers-Courcelette

15-22 Sep 16

Thiepval

26-29 Sep 16

►Le Transloy

. 1-18 Oct 16

Ancre Heights

1 Oct-11 Nov 16

Ancre, 1916

13-18 Nov 16

Allied Offensives: 1917

►Arras 1917

8 Apr-4 May 17

Vimy, 1917

.9-14 Apr 17

Arleux

28-29 Apr 17

►Scarpe, 1917

.3-4 May17

►Hill 70

.15-25 Aug 17

►Messines, 1917

.7-14 Jun 17

►Ypres, 1917

..31 Jul-10 Nov 17

►Pilckem

31 Jul-2 Aug 17

►Langemarck, 1917

.16-18 Aug 17

►Menin Road

.20-25 Sep 17

►Polygon Wood

26 Sep-3 Oct 17

►Broodseinde

.4 Oct 17

►Poelcapelle

.9 Oct 17

►Passchendaele

.12 Oct 17

►Cambrai, 1917

20 Nov-3 Dec 17

German Offensive: 1918

►Somme, 1918

.21 Mar-5 Apr 18

►St. Quentin

.21-23 Mar 18

►Bapaume, 1918

.24-25 Mar 18

►Rosieres

.26-27 Mar 18

►Avre

.4 Apr 18

►Lys

.9-29 Apr 18

►Estaires

.9-11 Apr 18

►Messines, 1918

.10-11 Apr 18

►Bailleul

.13-15 Apr 18

►Kemmel

.17-19 Apr 18

Advance to Victory: 1918

Amiens

8-11 Aug 18

►Arras, 1918

.26 Aug-3 Sep 18

►Scarpe, 1918

26-30 Aug 18.

►Drocourt-Queant

.2-3 Sep 18

►Hindenburg Line

.12 Sep-9 Oct 18

►Canal du Nord

.27 Sep-2 Oct 18

►St. Quentin Canal .29 Sep-2 Oct 18
►Epehy

3-5 Oct 18

►Cambrai, 1918

.8-9 Oct 18

►Valenciennes

.1-2 Nov 18

►Sambre

.4 Nov 18

►Pursuit to Mons .28 Sep-11Nov

Second World War

War Against Japan

South-East Asia

Hong Kong

 8-25 Dec 41

Italian Campaign

Battle of Sicily

Landing in Sicily 

   9-12 Jul 43

Grammichele 

15 Jul 43

Piazza Armerina

16-17 Jul 43

Valguarnera

17-19 Jul 43

Assoro 

  20-22 Jul 43

Leonforte

 21-22 Jul 43

Agira

24-28 Jul 43

Adrano 

29 Jul-7 Aug 43

Catenanuova

29-30 Jul 43

Regalbuto

29 Jul-3 Aug 43

Centuripe

  31 Jul-3 Aug 43

Troina Valley

 2-6 Aug 43

Pursuit to Messina

 2-17 Aug 43

 Southern Italy

Landing at Reggio

 3 Sep 43

Potenza 19-20 Sep 43
Motta Montecorvino 1-3 Oct 43
Termoli 3-6 Oct 43
Monte San Marco 6-7 Oct 43
Gambatesa 7-8 Oct 43
Campobasso 11-14 Oct 43
Baranello 17-18 Oct 43
Colle d'Anchise 22-24 Oct 43
Torella 24-27 Oct 43

The Sangro and Moro

The Sangro

19 Nov-3 Dec 43

Castel di Sangro

.23-24 Nov 43

The Moro

5-7 Dec 43

San Leonardo

8-9 Dec 43

The Gully

..10-19 Dec 43

Casa Berardi

 ..14-15 Dec 43

Ortona

20-28 Dec 43

San Nicola-San

.31 Dec 43

Tommaso

.
Point 59/ 29 Dec 43-

Torre Mucchia

4 Jan 44

Battles of the FSSF
Monte Camino

.5 Nov-9 Dec 43

Monte la Difensa-

2-8 Dec 43

 Monte la Remetanea

.
Hill 720

25 Dec 43

Monte Majo

3-8 Jan 44.

Radicosa

4 Jan 44

Monte Vischiataro

8 Jan 44

Anzio

22 Jan-22 May 44

Rome

.22 May-4 Jun 44

Advance

.22 May-22 Jun 44

to the Tiber

.
►Monte Arrestino

25 May 44

►Rocca Massima

27 May 44

►Colle Ferro

2 Jun 44

Cassino
►Cassino II

11-18 May 44

►Gustav Line

11-18 May 44

►Sant' Angelo in

13 May 44

Teodice

.
►Pignataro

14-15 May 44

Liri Valley
Liri Valley

18-30 May 44

►Hitler Line

18-24 May 44

►Aquino

18-24 May 44

►Melfa Crossing

24-25 May 44

►Ceprano

26-27 May 44

►Torrice Crossroads

30 May 44

Advance to Florence
Advance

17 Jul-10 Aug 44

to Florence

.
Trasimene Line

20-30 Jun 44

Sanfatucchio

20-21 Jun 44

Arezzo

4-17 Jul 44

Cerrone

25 - 31 Aug 44

Gothic Line
►Gothic Line

25 Aug-22 Sep 44

►Monteciccardo

27-28 Aug 44

►Montecchio

30-31 Aug 44

►Point 204 (Pozzo Alto)

31 Aug 44

►Monte Luro

1 Sep 44

►Borgo Santa Maria

1 Sep 44

►Tomba di Pesaro

1-2 Sep 44

►Coriano

3-15 Sep 44

►Lamone Crossing

2-13 Sep 44

Winter Lines
►Rimini Line

14-21 Sep 44

►San Martino-

14-18 Sep 44

San Lorenzo

.
►San Fortunato

18-20 Sep 44

►Casale

23-25 Sep 44

►Sant' Angelo

11-15 Sep 44

 in Salute

.
►Bulgaria Village

13-14 Sep 44

►Cesena

15-20 Sep 44

►Pisciatello

16-19 Sep 44

►Savio Bridgehead

20-23 Sep 44

►Monte La Pieve

13-19 Oct 44

►Monte Spaduro

19-24 Oct 44

►Monte San Bartolo

11-14 Nov 44

►Capture of Ravenna

3-4 Dec 44

►Naviglio Canal

12-15 Dec 44

►Fosso Vecchio

16-18 Dec 44

►Fosso Munio

19-21 Dec 44

►Conventello-

2-6 Jan 45

Comacchio

.
►Granarolo

3-5 Jan 44

Northwest Europe
Dieppe

19 Aug 42

Battle of Normandy
Normandy Landing

6 Jun 44

Authie

7 Jun 44

Putot-en-Bessin

8 Jun 44

Bretteville

8-9 Jun 44

       -l'Orgueilleuse .
Le Mesnil-Patry

11 Jun 44

Carpiquet

4-5 Jul 44

Caen

4-18 Jul 44

The Orne (Buron)

8-9 Jul 44

Bourguébus Ridge

18-23 Jul 44

Faubourg-de-

18-19 Jul 44

       Vaucelles .
St. André-sur-Orne

19-23 Jul 44

Maltôt

22-23 Jul 44

Verrières Ridge-Tilly--

25 Jul 44

         la-Campagne .
Falaise

7-22 Aug 44

►Falaise Road

7-9 Aug 44

►Quesnay Road

10-11 Aug 44

Clair Tizon

11-13 Aug 44

►The Laison

14-17 Aug 44

►Chambois

18-22 Aug 44

►St. Lambert-sur-

19-22 Aug 44

       Dives

.

Dives Crossing

17-20 Aug 44

Forêt de la Londe

27-29 Aug 44

The Seine, 1944

25-28 Aug 44

Southern France
Southern France

15-28 Aug 44

Channel Ports
Dunkirk, 1944

8-15 Sep 44

Le Havre

1-12 Sep 44

Moerbrugge

8-10 Sep 44

Moerkerke

13-14 Sep 44

Boulogne, 1944

17-22 Sep 44

Calais, 1944

25 Sep-1 Oct 44

Wyneghem

21-22 Sep 44

Antwerp-Turnhout

   24-29 Sep 44

Canal

.

The Scheldt

The Scheldt

1 Oct-8 Nov 44

Leopold Canal

6-16 Oct-44

►Woensdrecht

1-27 Oct 44

Savojaards Platt

9-10 Oct 44

Breskens Pocket

11 Oct -3 Nov 44

►The Lower Maas

20 Oct -7 Nov 44

►South Beveland

 24-31 Oct 44

Walcheren

31 Oct -4 Nov 44

Causeway

.

Nijmegen Salient
Ardennes

Dec 44-Jan 45

Kapelsche Veer

31 Dec 44-

.

21Jan 45

The Roer

16-31 Jan 45

Rhineland
The Rhineland

8 Feb-10 Mar 45

►The Reichswald

8-13 Feb 45

►Waal Flats

8-15 Feb 45

►Moyland Wood

14-21 Feb 45

►Goch-Calcar Road

19-21 Feb 45

►The Hochwald

26 Feb-

.

4 Mar 45

►Veen

6-10 Mar 45

►Xanten

8-9 Mar 45

Final Phase
The Rhine

23 Mar-1 Apr 45

►Emmerich-Hoch

28 Mar-1 Apr 45

Elten

.
►Twente Canal

2-4 Apr 45

Zutphen

6-8 Apr 45

Deventer

8-11 Apr 45

Arnhem, 1945

12-14 Apr 45

Apeldoorn

11-17 Apr 45

Groningen

13-16 Apr 45

Friesoythe

14 Apr 45

►Ijselmeer

15-18 Apr 45

Küsten Canal

17-24 Apr 45

Wagenborgen

21-23 Apr 45

Delfzijl Pocket

23 Apr-2 May 45

Leer

28-29 Apr 45

Bad Zwischenahn

23 Apr-4 May 45

Oldenburg

27 Apr-5 May 45

Korean War
Kapyong

21-25 Apr 51

Domestic Missions

FLQ Crisis

International Missions

ICCS            Vietnam 1973

MFO                 Sinai 1986-

Peacekeeping

UNMOGIP

India 1948-1979

UNTSO

 Israel 1948-    ....

UNEF

Egypt 1956-1967

UNOGIL

Lebanon 1958    ....

ONUC

 Congo 1960-1964

UNYOM

Yemen 1963-1964

UNTEA

W. N. Guinea 1963-1964

UNIFCYP

 Cyprus 1964-    ....

DOMREP

D. Republic 1965-1966

UNIPOM

Kashmir 1965-1966

UNEFME

Egypt 1973-1979

UNDOF

Golan 1974-    ....

UNIFIL

 Lebanon 1978    ....

UNGOMAP

Afghanistan 1988-90

UNIIMOG

Iran-Iraq 1988-1991

UNTAG

Namibia 1989-1990

ONUCA

C. America 1989-1992

UNIKOM

Kuwait 1991    ....

MINURSO

W. Sahara 1991    ....

ONUSAL

El Salvador 1991    ....

UNAMIC

Cambodia 1991-1992

UNAVEM II

Angola 1991-1997

UNPROFOR

Yugosla. 1992-1995

UNTAC

Cambodia 1992-1993

UNOSOM

Somalia 1992-1993

ONUMOZ

Mozambiq. 1993-1994

UNOMUR

 Rwanda 1993    ....

UNAMIR

Rwanda 1993-1996

UNMIH

Haiti 1993-1996

UNMIBH

Bosnia/Herz.1993-1996

UNMOP

Prevlaka 1996-2001

UNSMIH

Haiti 1996-1997

MINUGUA

Guatemala 1994-1997

UNTMIH

Haiti 1997    ....

MIPONUH

 Haiti 1997    ....

MINURCA

C.Afr.Rep. 1998-1999

INTERFET

E. Timor 1999-2000

UNAMSIL

Sie. Leone 1999-2005

UNTAET

E. Timor 1999-2000

Exercises

 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN

(Note: this article describes Canadian involvement in Operation MARKET-GARDEN and related operations. As these operations did not involve units to whom formal battle honours were awarded,  there are no a separate articles listed among the Battle Honours articles.)

While Canadian formations and units did not participate directly in Operation MARKET-GARDEN, individual officers of the CANLOAN program did serve with the British 6th Airborne Division. Additionally, the 20th and 23rd Field Companies, Royal Canadian Engineers were involved in a number of river evacuation missions in the wake of MARKET-GARDEN in the autumn of 1944, including Operations BERLIN and PEGASUS.

Allied Formation

Commander

German Formation

Commander

1. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
2. 21st Army Group (British - Canadian)
3. 1st Canadian Army
4. British 2nd Army
5. 12th Army Group (American)
6. U.S. 1st Army
7. U.S. 9th Army
8. U.S. 3rd Army
9. 6th Army Group (U.S. - French)
10. U.S. 7th Army
11. French 1st Army
(Not shown – 1st Allied Airborne Army, in the U.K.)

Eisenhower
Montgomery
Crerar
Dempsey
Bradley
Hodges
Simpson
Patton
Devers
Patch
De Lattre

1. Oberkommando West
2. Army Group "B"
3. 15th Army
4. 1st Parachute Army
5. 7th Army
6. Army Group "G"
7. 1st Army
8. 5th Panzer Army
9. 19th Army

Rundstedt
Model
Zangen
Student
Brandenberger
Blaskowitz
Knobelsdorff
Manteuffel
Wisse

Background

With the collapse of German resistance in Normandy at the end of August 1944, Allied forces found themselves with free rein on the far side of the Seine. After advances measured in yards per day in the summer's costly fighting, British and American tanks were able to make spectacular gains. American troops bumped up against the fortified Siegfried Line at Aachen while the British Army liberated Antwerp with its extensive port facilities. Fuel consumption became a larger menace than the Germans themselves. The Canadian Army, on the extreme left flank of the Allied advance, entered into several battles in September to help clear the channel ports of their German occupiers. In the meantime, the supreme commander General Eisenhower had to weigh two competing schools of thought with regards to overall strategy. The "broad front" policy meant that all the armies under his command were to maintain a steady advance against the enemy. Some of his subordinates, however were pressing for a "single thrust" to end the war.

Since the landing in Normandy, many operations for the growing airborne forces in the United Kingdom had been planned and then cancelled. The 1st Airborne Division has sixteen such operations cancelled between 6 June and 17 September 1944, often because the ground forces had advanced so rapidly the objectives had been captured before the airborne had a chance to deploy. Montgomery and Eisenhower both desired to usefully employ the newly created 1st Allied Airborne Army, and thus Montgomery proposed their use in an unusual "single thrust" operation which would get the British 2nd Army across the Rhine and behind the Siegfried Line north of the Ruhr.1

The Plan

MARKET-GARDEN was relatively simple in concept, but spectacular in its scope. As planned, it was – and remains – the largest airborne operation in history. Several airborne divisions were to land by parachute and glider, with the furthest – the British 1st Airborne Division – some 65 miles away from friendly lines.2 Each division was tasked with seizing bridges over vital waterways on a single highway leading from the positions of the British 30th Corps, to the bridge over the Rhine River at Arnhem. It was felt that a quick advance over this "carpet" of airborne troops could establish a firm bridgehead over the Rhine, from which operations could be mounted into Germany's industrial heartland of the Ruhr, bringing about a speedy end to the war in the calendar year of 1944. The link-up between ground forces and the troops in Arnhem was to be according to Mongomery's directive, "rapid and violent, and without regard to what is happening on the flanks."3

Nijmegen

The landings of the American forces went well, particularly because this drop occurred in daylight and scattering of the airborne forces was not as problematic as in earlier night drops. Bridges over the Aa River and Wilhelmina Canal at Veghel were captured intact and the Dommel River bridge at St. Oedenrode was taken undamaged, though a bridge at Zon over the Wilhelmina Canal was blown up by the Germans and caused a delay. The Grave Bridge to the south of Nijmegen was captured intact by a coup-de-main.4 

The 82nd landed north of the 101st against little resistance, their drops and landings proving "phenomenally successful" with only 1 of 482 planes and 2 of 50 gliders failing to reach their target areas.5 The division seized the Groesbeek heights and at 18:00hrs two companies were sent to seize a crossing bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen. Two large spans stood over the water: a rail bridge and a road bridge further east. German commanders made Nijmegen a centre of main effort and the reconnaissance battalion of the 9th SS Panzer Division was hurriedly dispatched there with a battle group from the 10th SS Panzer Division. Their orders were to block Allied troops long enough to annihilate the British in the Oosterbeek area. The seizure of the north ramp of the Arnhem bridge put a hamper on further German reinforcements, isolating units in the Nijmegen area, notwithstanding those units now willing to endure a long flanking march and slow ferry ride across the Rhine well upstream. Other reinforcements in the immediate area were activated including troops from the nearby Military District 6.6


The road bridge at Nijmegen after the battle.

The arrival of SS reinforcements had halted all forward motion by the Americans and thoughts of capturing a bridge vanished. The local Resistance did pass on that the Post Office in Nijmegen contained one of the firing mechanisms for destroying the bridges, and that same night a patrol seized the building and destroyed what they believed to be the firing mechanism.7 Fighting on the Groesbeek Heights led Major-General Gavin, commanding the 82nd Airborne Division, to abandon plans to seize the bridge that night and concentrate his forces against those arrayed against him to the east.8 A single company in Nijmegen was all that could be spared to continue the assault on the Waal bridges. The company attempted to bypass German resistance until they ran into SS defences close to the river and fell short of taking the road bridge by 100 yards.9

On 18 September (D+1) the 30th Corps, led by tanks of the Guards Armoured Division, had linked up with the 101st Airborne but were already behind schedule, delayed by opposition south of Eindhoven. The town was secured by U.S. paratroopers and when the tanks reached it that afternoon, bridging material was already on the way forward to replace the blown bridge at Zon. Another bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Best was heavily contested by German forces and troops of the 101st were unable to push them off. The Zon bridge was not completed until 06:15hrs on 19 September (D+2). Contact was made between the leading elements of British 30th Corps and the U.S. paratroopers in Grave just over two hours later.10

In Nijmegen, the additional troops split into two forces and prepared to assault both the road and rail bridges. The Eastern Force came under fire 300 yards from the road bridge where the Germans were heavily fortified in stone houses and an ancient fort called the Valkhof. Three British tanks were knocked out in exchanges with German flak and anti-tank guns. Attempts to gain an advantage by flanking the Germans through the side streets failed to succeed and the Eastern Force withdrew under heavy German artillery fire. The Western Force advanced with the paratroopers riding on the tanks and the British infantry mounted in armoured carriers. This force also ran into heavy opposition and were unable to penetrate to the rail bridge. Major-General Gavin asked the 30th Corps about the availability of boats, and a river assault was drawn up. The Guards Armoured Division's Royal Engineer Field Park Squadron brought up 26 assault boats while forces in Nijmegen continued to attack the approaches to the bridges.11

On the afternoon of 20 September an attack on the railway bridge gained ground as the U.S. paratroopers began fighting from rooftop to rooftop, but ultimately stopped short of the span.12 Originally planned for 08:00hrs, the river crossing was delayed when the boats failed to arrive. The entire MARKET-GARDEN operation was being mounted in places over a single road, often blocked by damaged vehicles and German counter-attacks. Just the day before the 107th Panzer Brigade had closed the highway to traffic by attacking the 101st at Son.

When the river assault finally began at 15:00hrs, it went off in flimsy canvas boats for which too few paddles had been provided (the men were required to row by hand, some with rifle butts), into a current that was strong and fast, and flowing away from Nijmegen in an area almost entirely under direct German observation, two miles to the west of Nijmegen. The only saving grace was that German anti-aircraft guns could not depress their gun barrels low enough and concentrated their fire on the two squadrons of British tanks assigned to cover the assault. There were 100 field guns firing in support, with a smoke barrage laid on to hide the attack. The restricted access imposed by the single road that 30th Corps was using to move supplies limited the number of rounds per gun to about 50 and all of MARKET-GARDEN's artillery shoots were likewise hampered until 26 September when the highway was finally cleared.

The river was 175 yards wide and one report states that the boats travelled the first 100 yards without a shot being fired. The Germans had not expected an attempt to cross "one of Europe's widest and fast(est) flowing rivers in daylight", in the words of one of the German divisional commanders, and the notion was disregarded as "inconceivable and dismissed as suicidal." Only scattered outposts had been placed out on the Waal. The infantry landed in good order on the far bank, and Royal Engineers started shuttling heavy weapons over. A 17th Century fortress 500 metres from the north end of the railway bridge was taken by 18:00hrs and the American flag run up the north end of the railway bridge. Resistance began to melt away at the south end during the evening, but either the success was never reported or the importance of the news was not realized by a headquarters fixated on the road bridge.13

Half an hour after the river crossing started British and American infantry attacked again toward the road bridge through the Valkhof Gardens which were by now fortified by engineers with crawl trenches and barbed wire. During the desperate fighting, a garbled radio message that the paratroopers across the river had "reached the northern edge of the bridge" was misunderstood to refer to the road bridge, not the rail bridge, and orders were given to the Grenadier Guards to dash ahead. A squadron of tanks – the last uncommitted reserves in the city – went forward and five managed to make it onto the bridge where they engaged German engineers and dismounted to cut the cables of the demolitions.14

The road to Arnhem was not yet open – more fighting in Lent to the north would continue, as well as counter-attacks on the bridges – but the fighting in Nijmegen proper was almost at an end.

Arnhem

Allied tanks crossed the Waal in the early evening of 20 September but did not advance on Arnhem. German counter-attacks continued to mount in several locations along the axis of advance, notably the Groesbeek Heights and Eindhoven. A general advance north did not continue until D+4, some 18 hours after the bridge at Nijmegen had fallen, over flat and wide open terrain perfectly suited for defending against armoured attacks. By D+6, however, the 1st British Airborne Division had been surrounded and cut to pieces.

After "phenomenally successful flights, drops and glider landings" on 17 September in which not a single aircraft was lost, other problems began to mount almost immediately.15 Intelligence reports about the existence of two SS armoured divisions refitting in the area had been downplayed or ignored. The drop zones were miles away from the bridge itself, due to congestion of forest and buildings as well as concentrations of enemy anti-aircraft guns closer to the city. Troops tasked to defend the distant landing zones, through which vital reinforcements and supplies would flow, could play no active part in the main fighting until those reinforcements landed - over the course of three successive days.16 Radio sets were unreliable and lacked range.17 Weather in the U.K. delayed reinforcement lifts and the initial air assault was made piece-meal due to aircraft shortages.The initial assault on the bridge was supposed to be carried out along a road to the north of Arnhem code-named "Leopard" by a fast-moving jeep-mounted reconnaissance unit, but the attack was delayed and then shot up in an ambush.

One battalion of paratroops under Lieutenant Colonel John Frost did reach the Arnhem road bridge on 17 September, travelling by a different route along the river bank (code named "Lion"). Other units were unable to follow them to the bridge as German defences crystallized. To make matters worse the divisional commander, Major-General Urquhart, set out on the first day to make personal contact with sub-units after the failure of his radio equipment and was cut off by German troops. Forced to take refuge among Dutch civilians he remained incommunicado for two full days. In his absence, two brigade commanders disputed who should take over command of the division.18

On 18 September German forces managed to seal off Lieutenant-Colonel Frost's 500-man battalion at the Arnhem bridge and prevented them from being reinforced by additional British units.19 Attempts to break through to the bridge were defeated by a strong German defensive screen, and even the arrival of fresh troops wasn't enough to tip the balance. Four battalions (one air-landing and three paratroop battalions) had to fall back into defensive positions around the Landing Zones on the night of D+2, their numbers down to about 200 in all. More frustrating was the fact that radio contact had been made with Frost and divisional headquarters realized the north ramp of the bridge had been taken.20

The planned landing of the 1st Independent Polish Parachute Brigade directly south of the bridge into Drop Zone "K" was postponed by bad weather in the United Kingdom, and then relocated because the Germans had overrun the DZ.21 Supply drops falling into insecure drop zones was an ongoing concern during the battle. Communication outside Arnhem, to 30th Corps, 2nd British Army, and I Airborne Corps in England was finally established, though supplies continued to be dropped unwittingly into German hands.22 Shortages of water, ammunition and medical supplies began to mount. In the early hours of 21 September Frost's men at the bridge were forced to surrender, at the least having denied Germans reinforcements a quick avenue of approach to Allied forces fighting at Nijmegen.23

The Polish parachute brigade finally arrived though they found the ferry at Driel they expected to carry them over the river had been sunk.24 What was more encouraging was the fact that 30th Corps units were so close that their artillery was now firing missions in support of the Oosterbeek perimeter. In the words of the General Officer Commanding 1st Airborne Division:

It is doubtful if any medium unit has ever shot so many rounds with such accuracy at such a range and at targets so close to our own troops. Many (German) attacks were broken up as a result of its fire and its support may have made all the difference to the ability of the defence to hold out for the time that they did.25

The 1st Airborne firmly established a three mile perimeter at Oosterbeek with 3,500 men. Attacks by various German units continued to increase in intensity, but British hopes were raised briefly on 22 September (D+5), when armoured cars of British 30th Corps managed to reach the positions of the Polish parachute brigade. Tanks and infantry followed behind down a narrow corridor that evening, and an attempt by the Poles to cross the river met with disaster.26

On 23 September a break in the poor weather that had dogged operations permitted air support to assist the British pressed into the Oosterbeek perimeter, while the remainder of the Polish brigade landed far to the south in a secure American drop zone rather than at Driel, passing directly into reserve. It had become clear that the 1st Airborne was too weak to assist 30th Corps in taking the Arnhem bridge even if they were to break through German resistance to reach it. The last chance of reinforcing or rescuing the beleaguered Oosterbeek force was through the link-up established at Driel. The 43rd (Wessex) Division strengthened their position there by clearing secondary roads and securing Elst. By nightfall a brigade had fought to the outskirts of Elst and another was in position in strength in the vicinity of Driel. The commander of 30th Corps still hoped to build a secure bridgehead over the Lower Rhine and sent assault boats to the Poles, but the Germans held the north bank, and attempts to cross the river under cover of darkness resulted in just 150 paratroopers getting across.27

On 24 September yet another river crossing was planned for that night, and 400 men of the 4th Dorsets went across in advance of the 43rd Divisions planned deployment into the bridgehead. There weren't enough boats, they were forced to assemble in daylight, and came under heavy German fire. Few reached the British perimeter and only about 75 saw the south bank again. At 09:30hrs on 25 September, the decision was made by 30th Corps and 1st Airborne Corps to withdraw the survivors of 1st Airborne Division back over the Lower Rhine.28


British prisoners taken at Arnhem. The photo was taken about 700 metres north of the road bridge. Two men are Royal Engineers and a third is from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, suggesting they were taken prisoner at the bridge itself as RE and RAOC units were located there during the fighting. Bundesarchive photo.

The well-planned withdrawal was carried out on schedule, where Canadian engineers used storm-boats to bring the British troops back across the river.29 The Germans were fooled into thinking the movement was a resupply effort and never realized the perimeter in front of them was collapsing. In all, 2,398 men were successfully evacuated, including 160 Poles and 75 men of the 43rd Infantry Division. Some 300 had to be left behind on the north bank as the sun came up and conditions became too dangerous to continue the operation.30

Canadian Participation in MARKET-GARDEN

By early 1944, the British Army found itself short of officers, especially for the infantry and ordnance corps. Canada, on the other hand, had a surplus, and through a scheme called CANLOAN, these young Canadian officers (mostly lieutenants) were assigned to duty with the British Army. In the end 623 infantry officers and 50 ordnance corps officers were so employed, the infantry officers being used as platoon commanders, company second-in-command, and in some cases even as company commanders. An attempt was made to have these officers join their affiliated units. Of the 673 volunteers, 465 became casualties, 127 of them fatal, and over 100 decorations for bravery were made, including 41 awards of the Military Cross.31

A total of thirty-two CANLOAN officers were made prisoners during the war, more than half of them during the fighting at Arnhem in September 1944. In fact, the greatest single concentration of the 673 CANLOAN officers was in the 1st Airlanding Brigade of the 1st Airborne Division, which boasted 47 Canadian officers on its rolls (23 serving in the 7th Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers, 13 in 2nd Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment,  and 11 in the 1st Battalion, The Border Regiment.) Eight of the KOSB battalion's 27 platoons were commanded by Canadians. Three Canadians also served in the parachute units of 1st Airborne Division, two with the 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, and Lieutenant James McKenna who was killed with 11 Para on 22 September.32

Only one Canadian, Lieutenant Leo Heaps, was with the 1st Parachute Brigade on 17 September, serving in a supernumerary capacity with the headquarters of the 1st Battalion of The Parachute Regiment. Heaps was captured on 25 September though he subsequently escaped and worked with the Dutch Resistance, earning a Military Cross.

Several Canadians landed with the 1st Airlanding Brigade and took part in the early fighting. Lieutenant Albert E. Kipping and Lieutenant Peter B. Mason both served in "D" Company of 7 KOSB. Kipping was killed on the 18th and Mason wounded and captured with men of his platoon. Lieutenant Albert E.F. Wayte was wounded with "C" Company and died of his injuries two days later. On 20 September Lieutenant Martin Kaufmann led a patrol of 7 KOSB outside the perimeter to ambush Germans near the railway embankment and was wounded in a full-scale German attack on the battalion positions later, leaving just two unwounded Canadians in 7 KOSB, Lieutenant Jim Taylor and Lieutenant Erskine Carter. Taylor was captured after being wounded during a German tank attack on "C" Company on 22 September.

Captain Basil W. H. Hingston of the 2nd Staffordshires was killed during the defence of the Drop Zones, and on 19 September Lieutenant Philip Hart Turner led his platoon of 2 Staffords into an attack on a hill at Der Brink. He later commanded part of the perimeter at Oosterbeek. Both actions were mentioned in the citation for a United States Distinguished Service Cross. Lieutenant John A. Wellbelove, one of three CANLOANS to land with 1 Border, was killed defending the area near Westbouing. The other two officers were Lieutenant Clifford M. Aasen and Lieutenant George W. Comper.

A CANLOAN officer was also serving in the 1st Grenadier Guards, part of the 30th Corps units fighting through NIjmegen. Lieutenant Larry Fazackerley was wounded on 20 September with No. 4 Company during an assault to break through to the Waal. There were also CANLOANS in the 4th Battalion of The Dorsetshire Regiment which had reinforced the Poles, and both took part in the crossing. Captain Thomas King and Lieutenant John Foote, the latter in "B" Company. Lieutenant J.L.P.H. Boucher also took part in the ferrying of troops as a CANLOAN officer from the RCE. Assigned to the 204th Field Company of the 43rd Infantry Division, he was awarded the Military Cross for actions on the Lower Rhine during MARKET-GARDEN.33

 
Only two CANLOAN officers of twenty that served at Arnhem managed to escape. Lieutenant W. Alex ("Doc") Harvie and Lieutenant Philip H. Turner both served with 2nd Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment and both were evacuated across the Rhine before the battle ended. Turner received the U.S. Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during the battle. LAC Photo

CANLOAN Officers During MARKET-GARDEN

Rank Name Unit Division Fate
Lieutenant Aasen, Clifford M. 1 Border 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Boucher, J.L.P.H. 204 Field Coy, RE 43rd (Wessex) MC
Lieutenant Boustead, Albert E. 2. Staffs. 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Cameron, Donald A. 7 KOSB 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Carter, Erskine E.R.E. 7 KOSB 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Comper, George W. 1 Border 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Erskine, James S. 2. Staffs. 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Fazackerley, Larry No. 4 Coy, 1st Grenadier Guards Guards Armoured  
Lieutenant Foote, John 4 Dorsets, "B" Coy 43rd (Wessex)  
Lieutenant Godfrey, Arthur R. 2. Staffs. 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Harvie, W. Alex 2 Staffs. 1 Airborne Evacuated, MID
Lieutenant Heaps, Leo 1 Para, "HQ" Coy 1 Airborne POW, escaped, MC
Captain Hingston, Basil W. H. 2. Staffs. 1 Airborne KIA 19 Sep 1944
Lieutenant Kane, Lawrence 7 KOSB 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Kaufmann, Martin 7 KOSB 1 Airborne WIA, POW
Captain King, Thomas 4 Dorsets 43rd (Wessex) POW
Lieutenant Kipping, Albert E. 7 KOSB, "D" Coy 1 Airborne KIA 18 Sep 1944
Lieutenant MacDonald, G. Smith 7 KOSB 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant MacDonald, John J. 2. Staffs 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Mason, Peter B 7 KOSB, "D" Coy 1 Airborne POW
Captain McCourt, James F 7 KOSB 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant McKenna, James 11 Para 1 Airborne KIA 22 Sep 1944
Lieutenant Norwood, Carlisle 2. Staffs 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Palen, Frank F. 2. Staffs 1 Airborne WIA, evaded capture
Lieutenant Taylor, Jim 7 KOSB, "C" Coy 1 Airborne WIA, POW
Lieutenant Taylor, Kenneth 2 Staffs 1 Airborne POW
Lieutenant Turner, Philip Hart 2 Staffs. 1 Airborne Evacuated, DSC
Lieutenant Wayte, Albert E.F. 7 KOSB, "C" Coy 1 Airborne DOW 20 Sep 1944
Lieutenant Wellbelove, John A. 1 Border 1 Airborne KIA 25 Sep 1944

One officer of 2 Staffords, Lieutenant Frank Palen, was wounded during the fighting at Arnhem, but went into hiding with a Dutch family. He managed to find his way back to British lines and eventually the U.K. where he joined the 12th Battalion, The Parachute Regiment. He was captured during the Rhine Crossing when he made a second combat jump with the 6th Airborne Division.34

Operation BERLIN

The 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade dropped on the south bank of the Lower Rhine around Driel on 21 September. Fifty men crossed the Lower Rhine to reinforce the pocket at Oosterbeek on the night of 22 September and 250 more crossed over in assault boats on 23 September. On 24 September the British 130th Infantry Brigade had linked up with the Poles at Driel and about two companies of the 4th Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment crossed over to the north bank of the Lower Rhine. The same day the decision was made to not reinforce 1st Airborne Division, but to evacuate them back across the Rhine. The operation began on 25 September (D+8) and was facilitated in part by two Canadian units, the 20th Field Company, RCE (commanded by Major A.W. Jones) and the 23rd Field Company, RCE (Major M.L. Tucker).35

The Canadian engineer units both belonged to First Canadian Army Troops Engineers (i.e. they were assigned directly to the First Canadian Army). They were joined in their task by the 260th and 553rd Field Companies, Royal Engineers of the British Army. The Canadian engineers were equipped with storm boats while the British units used assault boats.36 Storm boats were 20-foot long craft made with oak frames and plywood sides, powered by 50-horsepower Evinrude outboard motors capable of carrying 18 fully-equipped troops and travelling 6-knots when fully loaded.37 The assault boat was a smaller craft made of canvas and propelled by paddles. The Canadian Army's official history described the evacuation succinctly:

In dismal weather (which nevertheless helped to conceal their movements) the sappers brought their craft forward over difficult routes to the river's edge opposite the British bridgehead. All through the night the boats shuttled back and forth across the wide stream in driving rain, bringing exhausted survivors to safety under constant machine-gun and mortar fire. When daylight came the machine-guns up on the hill above the bridgehead rained a murderous hail of bullets on those craft which were still operating, but the downward angle of the fire was much less effective than it would have been had the guns been in position to make more horizontal sweeps. Mortar and 88 mm fire fell everywhere.

The 23rd Field Company worked at a site north-east of the village of Driel. Very few soldiers came down to embark at the point farther west to which the 20th had been allotted. When the evacuation ended, about 2400 men had been ferried back, most of them apparently in the stormboats of the 23rd. This company had five killed and three wounded. Among the men it brought out was Major-General R. E. Urquhart, the G.O.C. 1st Airborne Division. The company commander, Major M. L. Tucker, subsequently received the D.S.O., mainly for this night's work on the Neder Rijn.38

Major Tucker had anticipated Canadian participation in an assault crossing of the Lower Rhine beginning on 20 September (D+3) once it became known the north end of the Arnhem road bridge had been lost. Three Canadian engineer units (20th Field Company, 23rd Field Company and 10th Field Park Company) had moved up just south of Nijmegen on 21 September with Class 9 assault rafts and storm boats and placed under command of the 204th Field Company, R.E. (the 204th was a permanent unit of the 43rd Infantry Division's divisional engineers). A platoon of the 204th had been sent to ferry the Poles across on their second attempt across the Lower Rhine but for some reason the Poles had been left to man the assault boats on their own. A Canadian officer went with the 204th to reconnoitre possible launching points for storm boats, but complained that the British apparently had no confidence in the craft. On 23 September Canadians and their storm boats. once again played no part in a river crossing attempt by the Poles.39 The Poles instead had been using a small stock of assault boats and, more dangerously, pneumatic rubber boats (officially, Reconnaissance Boats) which were in essence 14-foot inner-tubes that were, in the words of one of the Polish engineers who participated in the crossings, "not meant for navigating swift rivers (and) very difficult to control."40

The 20th and 23rd Field Companies were warned to move at noon on 24 September, then ordered back to bivouac about two hours later when the reinforcement of 1st Airborne Division was scrapped. The assault crossing by the Poles and Dorsets once again did not include the storm boats, though the commander of 130th Infantry Brigade had known the Canadians were prepared and had in fact promised the boats to the commander of the Poles. The role of the Dorsets changed to reinforcing the perimeter to guarding the left flank of the withdrawal. The Commander, Royal Engineers of the 43rd Division, Lieutenant-Colonel W.C.A. Henniker, assigned two British engineer companies to assist the Canadian companies on the understanding there would be two main evacuation points. The majority of storm boats were assigned to the eastern crossing point. On the morning of 25 September, with the evacuation set for the night of 25/26 September, Major Tucker learned that the mission had changed to an evacuation. He sent two officers to reconnoitre a route to the river and select a crossing site for the 23rd. South of the river were two large dykes, a winter dyke 18-20 feet high a few hundred yards from the water, and a summer dyke 400 yards closer to the river just 7-10 feet high. An orchard was found to launch the storm boats from.41

During the reconnaissance, the 20th and 23rd Field Companies moved to a staging area closer to the river accompanied by 12 fitters and carpenters from the 10th Field Park Company. At 18:00hrs Major Tucker received his orders: the 23rd Company, 14 storm boats and  six of the tradesmen would proceed to the eastern crossing point in three jeeps, a scout car and twenty 3-ton lorries and the 20th received six storm boats and the other six tradesmen. Artillery cover started at 21:00hrs and the boats of the 23rd went into operation at 21:30hrs, the 20th two hours later. The 23rd launched their boats ten minutes earlier than the scheduled 21:40hrs, and had in fact no training in offloading the boats which normally required a derrick truck which was not available.42 The boats were stacked three high on the trucks, and each boat weighed 1,500 lbs when fitted with all equipment, including the 198-lb engine.43 When empty, the boats weighted 500 lbs. The boats were carried a quarter mile through dark and rain over both dykes, in muddy terrain under shell fire. The steep winter dyke proved to be wet and slippery, and though the boats had hand ropes attached, carrying bars were not fitted until after the operation. The fitters were also kept busy servicing the engines, having to change or service ten engines.44 Another concern was that the motors were not water-proofed, and that soaked spark-plugs would fail to ignite when the pull-starter was engaged. At least one of the storm boats was on the north side of the Rhine in heavily overloaded condition when the engine failed to start and it took "dozens" of tries on the pull-starter to get the engine to catch.45


A group of Arnhem survivors have their first drink after arriving at Nijmegen after the evacuation. Captain Jan Linzel (second from left) is a member of the Dutch Royal Navy attached to No 10 Commando. Imperial War Museum photo.

The western crossing area serviced by the 20th Field Company employed only British assault boats, and only 46 men of the Dorsets were evacuated in the swift current (including a trip by a section of Dorsets using an assault boat they found themselves on the north bank). Attempts late in the night to move four of the storm boats to the eastern crossing site to reinforce the 23rd resulted in the loss of one boat to mortar fire and the abandonment of a second under machine gun fire due to engine failure. Operations at the western crossing officially ceased at 03:30hrs.46

The 23rd Company was relatively safe from machine gun fire as Germans on the Westerbowing heights could not sweep the river but only fire downwards. Nonetheless, the first storm boat was sunk on launching by being holed by rocks, and the second boat was lost with its crew of four to enemy fire. The fourth boat capsized when passengers instinctively tried to dive flat from the sound of enemy fire and several men were lost in the river. By 03:30hrs the 14 remaining storm boats were in continuous operation. Wounded men were given priority in the evacuation, with 60 stretcher cases and 100 walking wounded flowing into the Regimental Aid Post of the engineers before being evacuated by truck to Driel. The river evacuation was a slow process, due mainly to the limitations of the boats themselves, which had no reverse gears, no clutches, and temperamental engines which stalled in the rain. By first light at 04:00hrs only two boats were operational and the exhausted storm boat crews of the 23rd were sent back to the orchard. Lieutenant Kennedy and others continued to make trips across the river, alternately coaxing storm boats to life, towing and paddling, until Major Tucker was ordered to cease operations at 05:45hrs. Of the 2,400-2,500 men evacuated, Major Tucker believed that all but 100 had been carried in his storm boats, carried over in 150 trips. Six men of the company had been killed, five wounded, and five were decorated, including a Military Cross to Lieutenant Kennedy.47

Monument to the Royal Engineers and Royal Canadian Engineers erected near Oosterbeek, on the west side of the Rhine. Photo taken by the webmaster on 11 June 2010. canadiansoldiers.com photo

 

Detail of the monument to the RE and RCE erected on the west side of the Rhine. "...they were just whispers and shadows in the night..." canadiansoldiers.com photo

Operation PEGASUS

The 23rd Field Company was involved in two final postscripts to MARKET-GARDEN in the weeks that followed. Operation PEGASUS I was the successful evacuation of 128 evaders from the 1st Airborne Division trapped on the far side of the Rhine. The operation was orchestrated by the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division. In November 1944 Operation PEGASUS II was intended to likewise evacuate another 120 men across the Rhine, but only a handful of men were in fact transported due to the presence of German patrols and tanks. The company moved to the Waal River where it opened a river ferry service, moving 6,500 men of the 101st Airborne back across the river, ending their service in the Nijmegen area.48

Paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division, U.S. Army, aboard a storm boat operated by the 23rd Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.), near Nijmegen, Netherlands, 27 November 1944. LAC Photo.

Canadian engineers operate a storm boat ferry across the Waal in November 1944. Canadian Army Photo.

Paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division wait to board storm boats operated by the 23rd Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, near Nijmegen, Netherlands, on 27 November 1944. Another sign to the STORM BOAT FERRY is just visible in the background. The “19” is a further identification aid in getting small groups of men married up with the correct boats. LAC photo.

Post Mortems

The MARKET-GARDEN operation has and will continue to be a source of analysis by historians. One chronicle of the Northwest Europe campaign sums up the general criticism by noting:

There were many reasons for the failure (of the operation), all copiously documented elsewhere. One of these was doubtless the ponderous and cautious relief operation conduct by Lt-Gen Brian Horrock's XXX Corps - a hallmark of British and Canadian commanders in North-west Europe of whom Horrocks was probably the most gifted. As the distinguished British General David Fraser put it, "It is difficult to imagine that a Rommel or a Patton on the Waal on 19th September 1944 could not have reached the Arnhem bridge - somehow."49

SS-Brigadeführer Harmel, who commanded troops at Nijmegen, concluded that if a crossing at Nijmegen had been secured on the first day "it would have been all over for us. Even if we had lost it on the second day, we would have had difficulty stopping them. By the time the English tanks arrived, the matter was already decided."50 Much criticism has been directed at the decision by British tanks to halt in Nijmegen on the 20th. The depiction of the event in the motion picture "A Bridge Too Far" has fuelled public awareness of the decision, but not knowledge of the events. 

Even if the Allies had the combat power to drive on towards Arnhem on the night of 20/21 September, they would have been unable to deploy off the road. In addition...they would have been under fire from the uncleared flanks, such as the fortified enemy position at Oosterhout. In addition, Harmel had directed that all available units were, 'to block the road between Elst and Lent with every available anti-tank gun and artillery piece because if we don't they'll roll straight through to Arnhem.' If the Guards had been able to advance, the resulting encounter battle would have brought the advance to a halt with heavy tank losses. The opportunity to complete the MARKET GARDEN plan had long passed with the failure to seize the Nijmegen Bridges at the beginning of the battle.51

Regarding the operation as a whole, the Canadian Army official historian closed his Arnhem chapter with:

All in all, if a score of Allied divisions had been able to cross the Rhine in September 1944 they would certainly have had a lethal and uncertain battle to fight; and nobody can contemplate without some apprehension the thought of these troops, deprived of help from other Allied ground forces, "slugging it out" with the desperate and determined enemy. Eisenhower had strong arguments on his side in favouring the conservative and prudent line rather than the bold one. The "broad front" policy defeated the Germans in the spring of 1945. It is possible that the more daring plan advocated by Montgomery, had it been fully accepted by Eisenhower at an early date and persevered in, would have defeated them in the autumn of 1944. But we must recall that in Operation "Market-Garden" the Supreme Commander went a long way towards Montgomery's policy, putting behind the thrust a degree of logistical support which the Field Marshal at the time thought "a great victory" and which gave him good hope of an early end to the war; and the operation failed. There is obviously no basis for a dogmatic statement.52

The U.S. Army's official historian summed up the operation as follows:

Operation MARKET-GARDEN accomplished much of what it had been designed to accomplish. Nevertheless, by the
merciless logic of war, MARKET-GARDEN was a failure. The Allies had trained their sights on far-reaching objectives.
These they had not attained.

On the credit side, MARKET-GARDEN had gained bridgeheads over five major water obstacles, including the formidable Maas and Waal Rivers. The bridgehead beyond the Maas was to prove a decided advantage in February 1945 when the 21 Army Group launched a drive to clear the west bank of the Rhine opposite the Ruhr. The bridgehead beyond the Waal was to pose a constant threat of an Allied thrust northward, through the Germans subsequently lessened the threat by a program of widespread inundation. Operation MARKET-GARDEN also had forged a salient sixty-five miles deep into enemy territory, had liberated many square miles of the Netherlands, and had gained some valuable airfields. It also had drawn some German formations from other sectors of the Western Front and had imposed upon these forces a high rate of attrition.

On the debit side, some might maintain that the cardinal point was the failure to precipitate a German collapse. Although the enemy's collapse was hardly a formal objective of the operation, few would deny that many Allied commanders had nurtured the hope. In regard to more immediate and clearly defined objectives, the operation had failed to secure a bridgehead beyond the Neder Rijn, had not effectively turned the north flank of the West Wall, had not cut off the enemy's Fifteenth Army, and had not positioned the 21 Army Group for a drive around the north flank of the Ruhr. The hope of attaining these objectives had prompted the ambition and daring that went into Operation MARKET-GARDEN. Not to have realized them could mean only that the operation had failed.53

Aftermath

The Nijmegen Salient – a large bulge in the lines - became a home to the American airborne divisions for several weeks, and later on a winter home for the entire Canadian Army in Northwest Europe as it rested after the Battle of the Scheldt. In April 1945, Arnhem was again fought over during Operation ANGER when 1st Canadian Army finally crossed the Rhine River and approached the city to liberate it from the Germans. While troops of the British 49th (West Riding) Division performed the main role of attacking the city, the Princess Louise Fusiliers, a machine gun unit of the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division, was also granted a Battle Honour for its participation in the battle.

Notes

  1. Smith, Wilfred I. Codeword: CANLOAN (Dundurn Press, Toronto, ON, 1992) ISBN 1-55002-167-2 pp.140-141

  2. Ellis, L.F. Victory in the West: Volume II The Defeat of Germany (Queen's Printer, 1968 - reprint by The Naval and Military Press Ltd, Uckfield, East Sussesx, UK, 2004) ISBN 1-845740-59-9 p.29

  3. Stacey, C.P. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume III: The Victory Campaign (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1960) p.313

  4. Ellis, Ibid, p.34

  5. MacDonald, Charles B. United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations. The Siegfried Line Campaign (Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1963 - reprint by Army Center of Military History 1993) p.159

  6. Ibid p.164

  7. Ibid

  8. Ibid, p.168

  9. Saunders, Tim Nijmegen: U.S. 82nd Airborne Division and Guards Armoured Division (Pen and Sword, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK, 2001) ISBN 0-85052-815-1 p.133

  10. Ellis, Ibid, pp.35-37

  11. MacDonald, Ibid, p.174. MacDonald cites combat interviews as giving a total of 33 boats, General Gavin himself as giving 28 boats. Saunders claims there were 32 boats in the Field Park Squadron stores and that 26 were left available for use after six were "destroyed on Hell's Highway." (pp.143-144).

  12. MacDonald, Ibid, p.175

  13. Saunders, Ibid pp.143-157

  14. Ibid, pp.158-188

  15. MacDonald, Ibid, p.170

  16. Ibid

  17. Levine, Allan J. D-Day to Berlin: The Northwest Europe Campaign (Stackpole Books, Mechanisburg, PA, 2007) ISBN 978-0-8117-3386-1 p.115

  18. Steer, Frank Arnhem: The Bridge (Pen and Sword, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK, 2003) ISBN 0-85052-939-5 p.68

  19. MacDonald, Charles B. Airborne (Ballantine Books Inc., New York, NY, 1970) ISBN 345-01827-X p.32

  20. MacDonald, Siegfried Line, Ibid, p.172

  21. Smith, Ibid, p.145 as well as Ellis p.38

  22. Ellis, Ibid, p.38

  23. Levine, Ibid, pp.111-115

  24. MacDonald, Airborne, Ibid, p.40

  25. Quoted in Ellis, p.41

  26. MacDonald, Siegfried Line, pp.195-196

  27. Ibid, p.196

  28. Ibid, p.197

  29. Ellis, Ibid, p.44

  30. MacDonald, Ibid, pp.197-198

  31. Stacey, C.P., Ibid, p.634

  32. Smith, Ibid, pp.223-225

  33. Ibid, pp.142-175

  34. Ibid, p.225

  35. Bennett, David. "A Bridge Too Far: The Canadian Role in the Evacuation of the British 1st Airborne Division from Arnhem-Oosterbeek, September 1944" Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4. (accessed online at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/history-histoire-01-eng.asp)

  36. Stacey, Ibid, p.316

  37. Sliz, John Engineer Assault Boats in Canadian Service (Service Publications, Ottawa, ON, 2006) ISBN 1-894581-43-1 pp.15-18

  38. Stacey, Ibid, p.316

  39. Bennett, Ibid

  40. Sliz, Ibid, pp.6-7

  41. Bennett, Ibid

  42. Ibid

  43. Sliz, Ibid

  44. Bennett, Ibid

  45. Sliz, Ibid, pp.18-19

  46. Bennett, Ibid

  47. Ibid

  48. Ibid

  49. McKay, Donald A. Gaudeamus Igitur "Therefore Rejoice" (Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) ISBN 1894255534 p.189

  50. Saunders, Ibid

  51. Ibid

  52. Stacey, Ibid, pp.321-322

  53. MacDonald, Charles, Ibid p.198


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