Background

When the Allied offensive actions in the Liri Valley began on 11 May 1944, their troops were engaged on the Garigliano River 60 miles from Rome. The headquarters of I Canadian Corps, along with 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division had proceeded to Italy in the autumn of 1943 and occupied positions on the Adriatic front during the winter of 1943-44, but the first true corps-level operations were those conducted in the Liri Valley. Likewise, the 5th Armoured had not operated in action as a division prior to these operations. The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade was involved in operations, but under British command.

Bad weather and strong enemy defences had prevented Allied entrance to the Liri Valley, protected also by mountainous terrain at Cassino and Monastery Hill where heavy fighting by French and American troops failed to create a breakthrough. Several attacks by Commonwealth forces also failed to take the heights and throughout April and May 1944 little change in positions along the entire Italian front could be effected. The massive landings at Anzio in January had failed to progress past far beyond the beaches, and American and British troops (including the American-Canadian 1st Special Service Force) were penned into a small bridgehead. Plans were made for a large-scale offensive using formations from the relatively dormant northern sector of the 8th Army's line, and both I Canadian Corps and 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade (under control of 13th British Corps) were assigned to take part. The effort was designed to crack German barriers known as the Hitler Line and Gustav Line.¹

The operation, code-named "Diadem", was scheduled for 10 May 1944 to preclude the withdrawal of German forces to face the coming invasion of Northwest Europe. The Canadian Corps would initially be held in reserve to exploit the expected breakthrough - in a role somewhat analogous to that of X Corps at Alamein.²

The 1st Canadian Infantry Division ended its period of duty on the Adriatic as part of the British 5th Corps on 21 April 1944, and moved south to the Campobasso area for rest, refitting, and special training in tank-infantry co-operation. Changes in command were rife in this period:

German Defences

The Liri Valley itself is between three and five miles wide, running south-east to north-west, nestled between parallel mountain ranges on which rest a number of villages. The north-eastern range terminates at Monte Cassino, which dominates the western range. Cassino , 1500 feet above sea level, is due west of the town of Cassino while 5000-foot Mount Cairo lies six miles to the north-west.

The LIRI River, which runs eastwards along the Southern side of the Valley,joins the GARI (RAPIDO) some six miles South of CASSINO, and then turning South becomes the GARIGLIANO. North-West from the GARI River the LIRI Valley is very flat and open for the first few miles gradually becoming more rolling and fairly heavily wooded. Six or seven miles from the beginning of the Valley a series of transverse gulleys run South-West towards the LIRI River. The Whole area was under intense cultivation and there was considerable standing grain.³

The Gustav Line was the zone running south from Cassino along the west bank of the Rapido (as the Gari is called in its course near Cassino) while the Adolf Hitler Line was built with even more formidable defences, pivoting on Mount Cairo. The Hitler Line was developed over the course of five months, but fortifications were not completed before the battle commenced. The Hitler Line ran more or less north to south in a line Piedimonte-Aquino-Pontecorvo-S.Oliva to a depth of 700 to 900 yards. An after action report by 1st Canadian Infantry Division noted:

In front of the line was a 1000 yds of flat ground with thick abundant crops, which limited observation from both the nigh ground of the HITLER LINE and our own (positions). Although the enemy, because of time and dlsorganization, had failed, to establish any outposts on this flat, any movement on it was subjected to intense mortaring, (artillery) and nebelwerfer fire.

The only natural (infantry) obstacle was along our right flank - the FORME D'AQUINO. Wire was continuous across the front with small 10 foot gaps covered by fire. A few anti-personel mines were scattered among the wire behind. Tank going across the whole front was gpod in certain places, only there being an anti-tank ditch 2000 yds long cutting off the approach to PONTECORVO on the main road PIGNATARO - PONTECORVO. Teller mines had been hurriedly laid in front of this ditch and within range of Anti-Tank gun fire; Also laid among the Tellers were wooden box mines.

The main def of the HITLER LINE was (anti-tank) and these defs had received priority in construction. Nine Mark V tank turrets on well-built concrete bases with living quarters below ground, were the A Tk nodal points. Grouped around these in every case were two to three towed 75 and 50 mm A Tk guns; these guns were however not dug in. (Infantry positions) were divided between two-man LMG pillboxes and the conventional slitl trench. The majority of the (positions) were in simple earthworks. A few (infantry positions) at the back of the line were found in uncompleted concrete bases prepared for the Mk V turrets, and TOBRUK STELLUNGS; most demolished houses hid MGs...⁴

Initial Attacks

The main attacks went forward on 11 May 1944, and though the Canadian Corps was in reserve, the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade was very active in support of the 8th Indian Division from the outset. The brigade crossed the Gari River, assisted in the capture of Sant' Angelo in Teodice, Panaccioni and Pignataro. The French expeditionary corps, in the meantime, had made such success that I Canadian Corps and 13th British Corps moved up to begin their part in the battle.

British Preparations and the Canadian Role

The order for DIADEM had come from General Harold Alexander, commanding 15th Army Group - the formation to which the two Allied armies in Italy (U.S. 5th and British 8th) belonged. The orders to the 5th Army to drive north and link up with the Anzio bridgehead, supporting the "main assault" of the 8th Army into the Liri Valley, did not specify which of the two armies was to be responsible for Rome. Both army commanders independently advised their subordinates that their own ultimate goals included the Eternal City. The U.S. 5th Army and therefore reduced the power of its thrust towards Valmontone in order to focus on the liberation of Rome, an action that resulted in the escape of a sizeable number of German formations, a matter of considerable controversy. The matter, however, was emblematic of a pattern of conflicting operational goals that characterized Allied conduct of the campaign, and which had an effect on Canadian operations as well.

Leese’s detailed orders for Operation Diadem called for co-ordinated advances by the Polish Corps against Monte Cassino, and the 13th British Corps across the Gari River. Ideally, the Germans would be forced to abandon the Cassino heights and withdraw to the Hitler Line to the west. In this optimistic scenario, the Poles would outflank the Hitler Line from the north, assisting a breakthrough by the 13th Corps. The Canadian Corps would be held in reserve to exploit a breakthrough or to assist 13th Corps.

The terrain and determined enemy resistance prevented the Poles and the British from achieving their goals, but 8th Indian Division and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade did succeed in establishing a shallow bridgehead across the Gari River before the exhausted, depleted infantry battalions ran out of steam. Leese decided to restore momentum by committing 78th British Infantry Div. and 1st Cdn. Inf. Div. to the struggle. Normally, these two fresh divisions–each operating with an armoured brigade and a considerable amount of artillery support–would have been part of a single corps to optimize command, control, and communication, not to mention co-ordinating intelligence on the enemy.

Since most of 13th Corps was to withdraw into reserve, the obvious solution was to place 78th British Div. under Lieutenant-General E.L.M Burns and 1st Cdn. Corps headquarters. Unfortunately, Leese, who in common with other senior British officers had opposed the creation of 1st Cdn. Corps, was not willing to allow Burns and his staff the opportunity to direct the battle. With two corps, each deploying a division in the narrow Liri Valley, and the Poles, part of yet another corps only a few kilometres away, radio channels were soon jammed, further jeopardizing co-ordinated action.⁵

The 1st and 3rd Brigades fought a confused action in the approach to the Hitler Line, beginning on May 16. Battalion actions lasted until May 18, when after command and control in the 1st Brigade had broken down, it was finally regained and both brigades had completed their advance. "It was, however, evident that the enemy had bought sufficient time to occupy these defences in strength." The British 78th Division, with Canadian tanks in support, tried its own attack south of Aquino, meeting heavy opposition while the Royal 22e Regiment put in a failed attack on the 19th. "And so a well-organized, set-piece attack on a wide front would be necessary to crack the Hitler Line." ⁶

The Hitler Line
See also articles: Hitler Line and Aquino

The directive for Operation CHESTERFIELD, the smashing of the Hitler Line, was issued on 20 May by 8th Army headquarters. It directed an attack on 23 May 1944 by XIII Corps between Aquino and Piedmonte on the right, and on the left an attack by I Canadian Corps centred on Pontecorvo an intended to exploit towards the Melfa River. As the corps made their plans, the Germans finally pulled out of the Cassino massif and French troops approached Pontecorvo, offering the hope of flanking pressure. An attempt on the 22nd to "bounce" the line with the 48th Highlanders and 142nd Royal Tank Regiment penetrated the Hitler Line but was stopped by extensive minefields slowing the tank support.

The attack was made on a two-brigade front behind a creeping barrage at 06:00hrs on 23 May; the Canadian plan had been for a much smaller attack on a narrow frontage. The 2nd Brigade assaulted on the right, with The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and PPCLI supported by Churchill tanks of The North Irish Horse. To the left the 3rd Brigade attacked with The Carleton and York Regiment with the 51st Royal Tank Regiment in support.

The 2nd Brigade attack started out well but a thick forest of oak trees separated the Patricias and Seaforths from their barrage, and the infantry lost direction in the woods. The 78th Division, on the right flank, failed to neutralize German positions in Aquino, on the flank of the Canadians, and they were able to bring down effective fire. Their tank support ran into a minefield which exposed them to the deadly panzerturms - dug-in tank turrets. The support battalion, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment, also followed too close behind, and suffered casualties with the leading companies, including the C.O. of the Edmontons. One company of Seaforths did manage to reach the Pontecorvo-Aquino road and knock out a number of positions before being cut off.

The 3rd Brigade assault was more successful. While the PPCLI had been committed in haste after the failed attempt to bounce the Line the day before, the Carletons had conducted numerous reconnaissance missions into the enemy defences and had a thorough understanding of them. Despite the loss of their tank support, they were able to penetrate the line by "leaning on" their barrage and in 75 minutes were on the Pontecorvo-Aquino road, having killed a number of Germans and captured 200 for the cost of 62 of their own killed and wounded.

The main effort then moved to the left, as artillery neutralized Aquino, The West Nova Scotia Regiment, Royal 22e Régiment and tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment widened the breach in the Hitler Line and took the final divisional objective, the Pontecorvo-Route 6 road. Despite the tanks being held up by the San Martino gully, this was done by last light, and enemy counter-attacks were satisfactorily dealt with.

Simultaneous to these 3rd Brigade actions, the 1st Brigade relieved the 2nd inside the Hitler Line defences near Pontecorvo. The divisional reconnaissance regiment, the IV Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, opened a lane through a minefield to the 48th Highlanders for tanks of the 142nd Royal Tank Regiment. The 48th, now with tank support, attacked Point 106 but were repulsed. The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment launched their own attack, relieved the 48th and took the position.

The single day of fighting was the worst in terms of casualties for the Canadian Army in the Italian Campaign, a day in which 890 Canadians were killed or wounded. The 2nd Brigade alone suffered 543 casualties, and supporting British armour lost 44 tanks. As these events occurred, the Allies were finally breaking out of the Anzio beachhead, threatening to cut the Germans off from the rear, making an exploitation of the Hitler Line penetration a priority.

The Melfa
See also articles: Melfa Crossing, Ceprano and Torrice Crossroads

The first divisional action of the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division was to be the exploitation of the penetration of the Hitler Line. The plan originally called for the division to follow up the 2nd Brigade's assault, but when the 3rd Brigade successfully broke through to their left instead, the 5th Division shifted their forces accordingly. This shift required the use of Assembly Areas, Forming Up Places and Start Lines that had not been properly scouted; the division - inexperienced - had not planned for this eventuality. The actual redeployment was also hampered by heavy rain, making movement of the vehicles in the 5th Armoured Brigade, as well as the trucks and carriers of the 11th Infantry Brigade, difficult.

The inexperience of the I Canadian Corps staff was also an issue in the Melfa battle, as traffic control was poor, and units of the 5th Division became entangled on the small road net with British tanks also trying to relocate after the Hitler Line battle. Canadian commanders also suggested later that trying to operate two separate corps in the narrow confines of the Liri Valley had been a mistake, and three armoured and four infantry divisions were operating some 20,000 combat and support vehicles in a 25 square mile area. The Canadians were forced to operate on secondary tracks of dubious value while XIII Corps was allocated Route 6, the only decent graded road in the valley. This problem was "rectified" by an edict from the 8th Army commander that corps could use roads allocated to other corps if need be, in some cases worsening the issue.

Into this confusion went the 5th Division, divided into two battle groups, on 24 May. The British Columbia Dragoons and The Irish Regiment of Canada were led by Lieutenant-Colonel Fred Vokes (brother of Major-General Chris Vokes, commanding 1st Division), and therefore known as VOKES Force. GRIFFIN Force consisted of Lieutenant-Colonel P.G. Griffin's Lord Strathcona's Horse tanks and The Westminster Regiment (Motor), which was to meet VOKES Force halfway to the Melfa. The Governor General's Horse Guards, the divisional armoured reconnaissance regiment, was to operate on the flanks with its Sherman tanks.

In its first clash, VOKES Force took on German Panther tanks and destroyed three, as well as a self-propelled gun, capturing 90 enemy paratroops as well, for the loss of 33 men and four of its Sherman tanks. GRIFFIN Force first met the enemy with the recce troop of the Strathconas, operating turretless Stuart tanks, who fought a short action and located a crossing on the river. A larger tank battle with the main force ensued, and 11 German tanks and 9 self-propelled guns were knocked out, with 25 prisoners and 36 dead, for a loss of 55 Canadians and 17 tanks. During fighting for the bridgehead across the Melfa, Major John K. Mahoney of the Westminsters distinguished himself and was later awarded the Victoria Cross.

The 11th Brigade took over the advance on 26 May with tank support from the 8th Princess Louise's (New Brunswick) Hussars. They faced determined opposition in extremely difficult terrain, but managed to reach Ceprano in a day. Traffic congestion caused to fuel shortages among the tank support and a bridge collapse delayed further advance until 28 May - when the new bridge was allocated to XIII Corps. The 5th Division shifted to the 1st Canadian Division front and continued to advance through poor terrain, wrestling their vehicles forward, this time with the British Columbia Dragoons and Westminsters in the lead. Five BCD tanks were lost to enemy action at Pofi (twenty more bogged down in the poor terrain conditions), while the 11th Brigade moved on Ceccano.

The Strathconas engaged elements of the 26th Panzer Division at Torrice Crossroads, as the enemy fought a rearguard action for their entire corps. Four German tanks and a self-propelled gun were knocked out in exchange for five Canadian Shermans. On 30 May, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was ordered into the advance in place of the 5th, the 2nd Brigade taking Frosinone, Ferentini was captured by the RCR on 1 June, and Anagni fell on 3 June, the same day Americans breaking out from Anzio made contact near Valmontone. Rome fell to the Allies the next day.⁷

Battle Honours

The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Liri Valley" for participation in these actions:
 

I Canadian Corps

• 1st Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons)

1st Canadian Armoured Brigade

• 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment)

• 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Three Rivers Regiment)

• 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)

1st Canadian Division

• 4th Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards)

• The Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG)

1st Canadian Infantry Brigade

• The Royal Canadian Regiment

• The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment

• The 48th Highlanders of Canada

2nd Canadian Brigade

• Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

• The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

• The Loyal Edmonton Regiment

3rd Canadian Brigade

• Royal 22e Regiment

• The Carleton and York Regiment

• The West Nova Scotia Regiment

5th Canadian (Armoured) Division

• 3rd Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The Governor General's Horse Guards)

• The Princess Louise Fusiliers

5th Canadian Armoured Brigade

• 2nd Armoured Regiment (Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians))

• 5th Armoured Regiment (8th Princess Louise's (New Brunswick) Hussars)

• 9th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Dragoons)

• The Westminster Regiment (Motor)

11th Canadian Brigade

• The Perth Regiment

• The Cape Breton Highlanders

• The Irish Regiment of Canada

Notes

1. Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 121

2. McKay, A. Donald Gaudeamus Igitur (Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) p.89

3. CMHQ Report No. 121, which references "1 Cdn Inf Bde In the Liri Valley Battle" by Comd 1 Cdn lnf Bde

4. CMHQ Report No. 121, which references "Report HITLER LINE Defences" by G.S. 1 Can Inf Div, Italy, June 1944, p.1 1 Can Corps Intelligence Summaries. 1 May - 24 May 44

5. Copp, Terry "Advancing on the Hitler Line: Army Part 74" Legion Magazine Published online 9 January 2008

6. Ibid

7. McKay, Ibid, pp.91-96