|
|
|
|
|
By the beginning of December, Allied troops had broken the German lines. The 2nd New Zealand Division crossed the River Moro to the west of the Canadians but failed to take Orosgna. Charles Allfrey, commanding the V Corps of the British 8th Army, to whom the Canadian Division was assigned, signalled Major-General Christopher Vokes, their commander. "You must get over the River Moro as soon as possible." Bloody December was under way1, and with it the Moro River campaign. This would be the first real divisional level battle fought by Canadians in the Second World War. All of the division's infantry battalions fought desperate actions during the next two weeks and the Canadians fought their way through the Moro River Valley, taking villages, towns, crossroads and a feature known only as "The Gully." Losses were high, the weather and mud challenging, and pressure from higher headquarters, including General Montgomery, was intense. The Decision to Attack OrtonaWhen The Gully was finally taken, no one expected the Germans to remain in Ortona for several reasons:
The City The Allies expected Ortona to be taken peacefully, and as they wished to turn it into an administrative centre, complete with port facilities, the city proper was spared any serious bombardment. Most of the 10,000 inhabitants had gone; large numbers of the able-bodied males had been removed for slave labour duties in the Reich or fascist-controlled Italy, and the remaining civilians had largely fled to the surrounding mountains and nearby railway tunnels. The city consisted of an older, densely built up area, and a more modern area to the south. The old section consisted of well built stone houses with very narrow streets. Most buildings had cellars leading to underground passages under the street, sometimes linking as many as half a dozen houses. The new section, of more modern houses, had wider streets and more paved squares.
At left, a prewar view of Ortona, looking north over the dock area. At right, a views of Ortona circa 2005 from Wikipedia. The mountains to the west of Ortona are visible. The photo shows the size of the coastal cliffs, and the rebuilt San Tomasso Cathedral is plainly visible. Below, the castle dominating the north end of Ortona. |
![]() |
|
Personnel of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment having tea and sandwiches outside Battalion Headquarters, Ortona, Italy, 21 December 1943. Wool Battle Dress was issued out every autumn in Italy and withdrawn in the spring during the hot summer months. The soldier in the foreground is wearing typical accoutrements of the front line infantryman; a cloth bandolier for rifle ammunition has been tied around his waist, and what appears to be a shell dressing is attached to his helmet. Enameled mugs were standard issue to Canadian troops, in either a dark brown or white; both can be seen in this photo. Along with the standard two-piece metal mess tin, an example of which is held by the soldier in the centre, this formed the full complement of a soldier's eating utensils, along with a knife/fork/spoon. Library and Archives Canada photo. |
![]() |
|
Sorting of mail for personnel of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment near Ortona, Italy, 21 December 1943. The reality of combat for about half the men in every rifle battalion was that they would never see a shot fired in anger, even if they were close enough to hear the guns, or be killed by shellfire. The staff sergeant is likely one of the Company Quartermaster Sergeants; he still wears the older pattern Field Service Cap while the captain at right wears the khaki beret introduced in 1943 to the Canadian Army. The captain also has a shell dressing looped around the shoulder strap of his battle dress. While the soldiers of "F" Echelon of the battalion were playing their deadly cat and mouse game inside the city, the supporting elements of the battalion plied their trade further back - still exposed to German gunfire, doing work far less glamorous yet no less important to morale or even physical well-being of the soldiers. The CQMS, who appears to have a pistol thrust into the front of the Battle Dress, would later likely be delivering not just mail but hot food, ammunition, water and other essentials as close to the soldiers in contact as possible. Library and Archives Canada photo. |
German forces are now penned in between the demolished San Tommaso cathedral and the Castle; German positions in the Cemetery, previously resisting furiously, are finally reduced by the Seaforths with the help of heavy artillery fire. For the first time, naval gunfire is used in support of the troops in Ortona as Allied warships arrive off the coast.
After dark, a night time communication arrived at the last German command post, a warehouse in Terravecchia, one of the northern districts. Hauptmann Liebscher was ordered to save what was left of his battalion. Warnings from the Canadians - to Germans and civilians alike - had been given that carpet bombardment of the city would be carried out at 10:00 on the 28th.
Stunned Canadian patrols advanced on the castle to find that Ortona was apparently free of the enemy. In fact, they had slipped out of the city the previous night, withdrawing to the north. Efforts by allied troops to the northwest of the city had failed to cut Highway 16. However, the 1st Brigade had not been idle, and a series of attacks had been mounted, in order to further develop a salient that had been created during the earlier fighting for The Gully, particularly that gained in MORNING GLORY.
These operations were designed to cut the main coast road and thus isolate the Ortona garrison, and there is little doubt that the threat which they created to his communications hastened the enemy's decision to concede the town to the 2nd Brigade.3

Casualties for the Loyal Edmonton Regiment had been 172 (over 60 of which were fatal). The Seaforths had lost 42 killed and 78 wounded. German losses remain unknown, though 100 bodies were recovered by the Canadians after the battle. One source states that 200 Germans were killed in total.
After the battle, Jim Stone, commanding "D" Company of the Loyal Edmontons, was asked "If you had to do this again, what would you like for troops?" His reply was "German paratroops."
After Ortona, the entire 1st Division went into winter positions on the south side of the Arielli River Valley, and a three month programme of patrolling began, as reinforcements were absorbed and the armies on both sides waited for spring, and campaigning weather. The Division had been badly hurt during the month of December; as a whole, the division lost 695 killed, and with wounded, sick and missing, casualties equalled 4,206.
Two German divisions were seriously mauled in the Moro campaign; 90th Light and 1st Paratroop. By the time the 90th Light Division was relieved, its insistence on mounting unnecessary counterattacks had depleted it badly. Months were needed to rebuild the division; one battalion of the 361st Panzergrenadier Regiment had only 12 men left. Some 400 Germans from this division were in Canadian PW cages in addition to hundreds more killed and wounded.
As Canadian reinforcements made their way north to join their new units (though even on the last day of December the Division remained 1,050 men below authorized strength), they passed a small sign left behind at the entrance of the city by proud Vancouverites and Edmontonians: THIS IS ORTONA. A WEST CANADIAN TOWN.
Historically, the city was divided into two sectors, with the Loyal Edmontons taking the right half of the city and the Seaforths taking the left - crossing over from their original positions on the first day's approach. The fighting in the city included the use of tunnels by the Germans, and "mouseholing" by the Canadians. This was the use of demolitions to move from one building to another, by blowing holes in rooftops or walls.
Western Allied troops had to this point in the war only experienced brief urban warfare encounters (such as at Calais in May 1940). Ortona was the first, sustained instance of house-to-house fighting. However, the concept of street fighting (what became known after the Second World War as FIBUA - Fighting In Built-Up Areas and even later as MOUT - Military Operations in Urban Terrain) dates back to antiquity and the Roman author Vegetius who discussed the subject as a tactical problem. The British Army by 1939 considered the prospect of fighting in built-up areas undesirable, but nonetheless had procedures for it in their manuals, though street fighting was considered as a means of mopping up after an attack rather than the main objective of an offensive operation. The Home Guard - the object of mirth thanks to postwar comedic television - actually concentrated on serious training in urban combat thanks to the real fear of German invasion in the summer of 1940. Canadian units - including the 1st Canadian Infantry Division - had frequent contacts with Home Guard units in that period and occasionally exercised with them. The British Army's manual on urban warfare, first published in 1943, bore striking resemblance to the Home Guard's own manual on Fighting in Built-Up Areas published in January 1943.4
Artillery was generally used for harassment and interdiction fire on targets outside the town, and the close in terrain really didn't allow for the 25-pounder Guns of the field regiments to contribute much to the fight inside the city proper.
The Saskatoon Light Infantry, however, used their 4.2 inch mortars to good effect; in one single day of the battle some 1100 rounds of 4.2 inch ammunition were fired by the SLI. Even the 2-inch mortars of the infantry platoons were considered effective in the city - they were aimed out of windows and fired across streets.
Many were devised by the Canadians in Ortona to increase the effectiveness of their weapons in the unfamiliar context of urban warfare. Boys Anti-Tank Rifles were brought out of storage and used to blow locks off of doors; No. 36 Hand Grenades were reportedly bowled down hallways like cricket balls.7
Both the infantry's organic 6-pounders and the 17-pounders of the 90th Anti-Tank Battery, were used in the city to good effect, giving effective direct fire HE capability to the infantry in addition to the Shermans.
|
|
|
The Three Rivers Regiment lost only three Sherman tanks in the fighting; they were used not only as mobile pillboxes but also to transport ammunition and mortars forward, and to evacuate wounded down bullet-swept streets. To step into the street in Ortona was generally regarded as suicide. Armour Piercing tank shells were used to knock holes in building walls, followed immediately with High Explosive so as to explode inside the building.
Mouseholing
One reference cites the use in Ortona by Canadian troops of an improvised "mouseholing charge" made from No. 75 "Hawkins" Grenades (i.e. pressure detonated anti-tank mines) attached to wooden sticks, secured together with tape, and rigged with primacord and safety fuses. The devices, which could be modified to included four or five charges and detonated simultaneously, were designed to blow holes in walls large enough for a man. An illustration of such a device can be found in a Home Guard instruction dated January 1943, apparent evidence of the possible influence of the Home Guard's tactical training on Canadian urban tactics at Ortona.8

A Loyal Edmonton Regiment platoon commander described the fighting at Piazza Municipale:
...We had worked forward until, at about 1000hrs, we held the houses marked A and B on the diagram. Here we could observe the piazza municipale and exchange fire with German paratroopers in the church and school and the blocks marked D and E. The end of the school facing us was solid. So was the corner of block C. They offered no easy entrance. Our objective was the school.
I had a plan that showed the only entrances to the school were the main door facing the church and a small door at the far end. We could not get through the main door without coming under murderous fire from the church and the school itself. The alley toward E was a deathtrap, its entire length being swept by fire from both D and E. Our anti-tank guns could have knocked a hole in the end wall of the school large enough for a man to squeeze through, but it was essential to obtain fire superiority, to win the fire fight, before any movement took place.
This was going to be tricky; the enemy knew all our likely positions and completely dominated the square.
We decided to make a direct assault on the school, supported by tanks, with smoke if necessary. A troop of three Three Rivers tanks was made available and between us we worked out a plan to cope with the enemy machine guns. One of our problems was the block of rubble obstructing the entrance to the square between A and B. This was overcome by the tanks discovering a satisfactory bypass. Zero Hour was set for noon.
The first tank came rumbling up the street to position 1. At a range of 30 yards, it blasted down the side of the school with its 75mm gun. This tank then moved to position 2, a second tank to position 3 and a third to position 1. The tanks at 2 and 3 covered the church with machine-gun and 75-mm fire, while the tank in position 1 covered the street leading to B. The fire fight was won and the stage set for my platoon. So much dust had been kicked up by the gunfire and falling masonry that smoke was unnecessary and, without further preliminaries, the first section dashed across the street, struggling over rubble, entered the school and started clearing the building. The tanks knocked down part of the front wall of the church and silenced the machine-gun post there.
After what seemed an interminable time, although it probably was no more than a half hour, the section leader signaled all was well. I ordered a second section to move to the house at C to control the back of the school and bring fire down the street toward G. I hoped, in this way, to maintain fire superiority once the tanks withdrew.
With the remaining sections, I dashed across to the school. Everything was under control. The section leader had his men at the windows, and though he had not yet searched the cellars, the main floor was clear. There was no upper story. The section leader said he'd had little difficulty in clearing out the few Germans left in the school. We had caught them by surprise and the tank shells had driven them from the exposed end of the building. Once the section had gained a footing it moved rapidly forward, using grenades and tommy guns, clearing each room as it advanced. The enemy put up little opposition and succeeded in evacuating the building from the rear exit, taking most of their casualties. We searched the cellars rather gingerly and found no Germans. The sun was beginning to set by the time the building was cleared and I therefore ordered the tanks, which were running out of ammunition, to withdraw.
In this action my platoon sustained only one casualty. Success could not have been obtained without the invaluable assistance of the tanks...9
A Canadian officer's report was published in the Intelligence Bulletin in July 1944 and has been reprinted widely on the internet. The text of that article follows:
- HOW THE ENEMY DEFENDED THE TOWN OF ORTONA
The German defense of Ortona was well planned. The defensive layout was based on an intimate knowledge of the town, the approaches, the streets, the alleyways, and the best routes from street to street, building to building, and even room to room. With this detailed knowledge, the enemy sited his weapons and carried out a determined defense, the outstanding feature of which was acknowledged by our [Canadian] troops to have been "sheer guts."
The enemy had chosen a "killing-ground," and all his weapons were sited to cover this area. Where the approaches to the "killing-ground" could not be covered by fire, the Germans had demolished buildings so as to create debris obstacles. The enemy could, and did, cover these debris obstacles by fire. Groups of machine guns were always sited so that the fire of one supported the fire of another.
- Defence of an Intersection

The diagram shows a typical German defensive position at the intersection of a street and an alley.
In this instance, machine gun No. 1 was sited so as to cover the crest of the pile of debris which had been created in the main street on the other side of the alleyway. Machine gun No. 2 was sited high up in a building so as to fire over the top of the debris pilethat is, so as to cover our approaches to it. Machine guns No. 3 and No. 4 gave supporting fire and also had the mission of intercepting any of our troops who might contrive to get past the pile of debris and attack machine gun No 1. (In almost every case, the piles of debris had been booby-trapped and mined with S-mines and Tellermines.)
The enemy made use of flame throwers, although not extensively, employing them for missions similar to those of supporting machine guns. In the few instances in which flame throwers were used, they were sited at ground level behind piles of debris, so as to cover the approaches to the street crossings.
The enemy's antitank guns had been well sited so as to cover the approaches suitable for tanks. These guns were cleverly camouflaged, and each was provided with all-around defense by light machine guns, heavy machine guns, and snipers.
The Germans did not use mortar fire extensively. When it was employed, firing was not observed, but was placed on parts of the town behind those areas where our troops were committed. There were several instances in which the enemy placed mortar fire on his own areas.
The enemy used snipers to support machine-gun and antitank positions.
The corner buildings of major road intersections were invariably demolished so as to create debris obstacles, up to 12 feet high, which were to be impassable to tanks. These obstacles also provided the enemy with good ground cover.
As the enemy was driven back, he carried out a planned demolition of buildings. In certain instances, he had prepared buildings for demolition and blew them after they had been occupied by our troops.
At no time did the enemy make a determined counterattack to retake the buildings that we had occupied. However, he immediately reoccupied any building which had been captured by our troops and later evacuated to permit our tanks and antitank guns to place fire on adjoining buildings.
He surrendered none of his positions readily. They had to be knocked out one by one, and, if our troops did not get forward and occupy them promptly after disabling the German holding force, the enemy would reoccupy them almost at once.
It was a grim and bitter defense, and a very costly one for the Germans. The enemy frequently replaced personnel in positions as often as four times before our troops were able to occupy and consolidate the ground or the building.
Since the enemy was thoroughly familiar with the layout of the town, he was able to use this knowledge to advantage. As he was forced back, he chose his successive "killing-grounds" and sited his weapons accordingly. It was only by attacking with the greatest determination that we were able to win these areas from the enemy and, by so doing, eventually complete the occupation of Ortona.
The Germans never counter-attacked the Canadians, instead defending from solid defensive positions in the multi-story buildings, and making liberal use of booby traps and demolitions (see below).
The most notorious example of German demolitions was when a house occupied by a Loyal Edmonton platoon commanded by Lieutenant E.D. Allen was blown up by German pioneers. Twenty-three men died and the lone survivor, Lance Corporal Roy Boyd, was trapped in the rubble for three days before being rescued.

Lance Corporal Boyd is rescued after
three-and-a-half days under the rubble. LAC photo.
Not long after, Canadian engineers killed some four dozen Germans when they similarly mined an enemy occupied house.
The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Ortona" for participation in these actions:
11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment)
12th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Three Rivers Regiment)
The Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG)
The Royal Canadian Regiment
The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment
The 48th Highlanders of Canada
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment
Little Stalingrad in Combat Mission.
Simulations Canada released Ortona in 1983, a traditional two player hex and counter wargame.
An Historical module for Advanced Squad Leader has been under development for many years.
The Special Edition release of Combat Mission:Afrika Korps contained an Operation entitled Little Stalingrad, designed by the webmaster, depicting the fighting in Ortona.
Dancocks, Daniel G. D-Day Dodgers: The Canadians in Italy 1943-1945 (McClelland & Stewart Inc., Toronto, ON, 1991) ISBN 0771025440 p.154
Copp, Terry "The Battle for Ortona" Legion Magazine (November 1997) accessed online at http://legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/1997/11/the-battle-for-ortona/
Nicholson, Gerald. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume II: The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1957)
Bull, Stephen World War II Street-Fighting Tactics (Osprey Publishing Ltd., Botley, Oxford, UK, 2008) ISBN 978-1-84603-291-2 pp.3-13
Roy, Reginald The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 1919-1965 p.266
Copp, Ibid
Roy, Ibid
Bull, Ibid, p.29
Quoted in Reader's Digest: The Canadians at War 1939-1945 2nd Edition (Reader's Digest Association (Canada) Ltd., Westmount, PQ) ISBN 0888501455
Dancocks, Daniel D-Day Dodgers: The Canadians in Italy 1943-45
di Tullio, Saverio 1943: The Road to Ortona (Translated from Italian by Angela Arnone and Alex MacQuarrie) (1998, Legas)
Roy, Reginald The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 1919-1965
Zuehlke, Mark Ortona: Canada's Epic World War Two Battle
ALBERTA IN THE 20TH CENTURY Volume Eight: THE WAR THAT UNITED THE PROVINCE (Section Four: Pain, Death and Victory - Alberta's soldiers make military history at Italy's Ortona). (2000 United Western Communications Ltd.)
THE CANADIANS AT WAR: 1939/45 Volume Two (1969 The Reader's Digest Association)